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Abstract
Economic inequality has increased in most large free-market economies during the last century
and it has been suggested that this phenomenon is an inherent feature of free-market activities.
It seems self-evident, however, that a continual rise in economic inequality is unsustainable. In
fact, severe economic inequality has historically been associated with negative effects such as poor
economic growth, severe financial recessions or even violent revolutions. Wealth redistribution is
present in every form of government, although the extent thereof varies, and existing theoretical
justifications of redistributive actions usually rely heavily on utility theory.
Most economic postulates related to inequality are empirically inspired and defended, but be-
cause of the vast variety of possible economic contexts in which they may prevail, many of these
claims are disputed. One example is the so-called Robin Hood paradox, which asserts that the
extent of wealth redistribution is less in more unequal societies, where it is needed most, than in
more economically equal societies. Another is the Kuznets curve, which predicts that the extent
of inequality in a developing economy will follow an inverted ‘u’ curve as a result of development
over time.
The implications of increasing relative inequality over time as an inherent feature of wealth
growth are investigated in the presence of wealth redistribution. Very simple mathematical
model abstractions are employed to shed light on the possible evolution over time of wealth
distribution in the context of very basic assumptions, since such behaviour may perhaps then
also be inferred in more complicated settings.
Assuming increasing per capita wealth growth-rate functions is one way of capturing increasing
relative inequality over time, the very simplest case being linearly increasing per capita wealth
growth-rate functions, which are considered in this thesis. Two examples of redistribution dy-
namics are investigated. One example mimics diffusion-like effects of trickle-down redistribution,
while the other represents a conservative, linear-tax transfer scheme.
It is established analytically within the context of the aforementioned mathematical models that
increases in economic inequality can always be limited by means of sufficient redistribution. It is
also demonstrated that the Robin Hood paradox may follow from very simple assumptions. It is
furthermore illustrated that fluctuating behaviour in the evolution over time of wealth inequality
can even manifest itself in the absence of time-dependent processes, and hence that explanations
of such trends which merely assume time-dependent underlying processes might be of dubious
value. Examples of analytical formulations of theoretical justifications for redistributive actions,
independent of utility theory, are finally also provided.
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Uittreksel
Ekonomiese ongelykheid het gedurende die laaste eeu in die meeste groot vryemark ekonomiee¨
toegeneem en daar is al voorgestel dat hierdie verskynsel ’n inherente eienskap van vryemark
aktiwiteite is. Dit blyk egter voor die hand liggend te wees dat ’n voortdurende toename in
ekonomiese ongelykheid onvolhoubaar is. Ernstige ekonomiese ongelykheid het trouens histo-
ries hand aan hand gegaan met newe-effekte soos stadige ekonomiese groei, ernstige finansie¨le
resessies en selfs gewelddadige revolusies. Die herverdeling van rykdom is in elke vorm van
regering teenwoordig, alhoewel die mate daarvan varieer, en bestaande teoretiese regverdigings
vir herverdelingsaksies berus gewoonlik swaar op nutsteorie.
Die meeste ekonomiese postulate wat te make het met ongelykheid is empiries-ge¨ınspireer en
word ook sodanig verdedig, maar baie van hierdie bewerings word as gevolg van die groot
verskeidenheid moontlike ekonomiese kontekste waarin hul mag voorkom, betwis. Een voorbeeld
hiervan is die sogenaamde Robin Hood-paradoks waarvolgens die mate van rykdom-herverdeling
minder is in meer ongelyke gemeenskappe, waar dit juis me´e´r benodig word, as in ekonomies
meer gelyke gemeenskappe. Nog ’n voorbeeld is Kuznets se kromme waarvolgens voorspel word
dat die mate van ongelykheid in ’n ontwikkelende ekonomie ’n omgekeerde ‘u’ kromme sal volg
soos ontwikkeling oor tyd geskied.
Die gevolge van toenemende relatiewe ongelykheid oor tyd as ’n inherente kenmerk van toene-
mende rykdom, in die teenwoordigheid van rykdom-herverdeling, word in hierdie tesis ondersoek.
Baie eenvoudige wiskundige modelabstraksies word ingespan om lig te werp op die moontlike
evolusie oor tyd van die verdeling van rykdom in die konteks van baie basiese aannames, aange-
sien sodanige gedrag dan ook moontlik in meer ingewikkelde kontekste afleibaar is.
Die aanname van toenemende per kapita groeitempo-funksies is een manier waarop die toe-
name in relatiewe ongelykheid oor tyd vasgevang kan word. Die heel eenvoudigste geval hier-
van is lineeˆr-toenemende per kapita groeitempo-funksies, wat in hierdie tesis oorweeg word.
Twee voorbeelde van herverdelingsdinamika word ondersoek. Een voorbeeld boots die diffusie-
verwante gedrag van deursyferingsherverdeling na, terwyl die ander ’n konserwatiewe, lineeˆre
belasting-oordragskema is.
Daar word binne die konteks van die bogenoemde wiskundige modelle analities vasgestel dat toe-
names in ekonomiese ongelykheid altyd deur genoegsame herverdeling beperk kan word. Daar
word ook aangetoon dat die Robin Hood-paradoks die gevolg van baie eenvoudige aannames
mag wees. Verder word daar gedemonstreer dat wisselende gedrag in die evolusie van rykdom-
ongelykheid oor tyd selfs in die afwesigheid van tyd-afhanklike prosesse mag voorkom en gevolglik
dat verklarings van sulke tendense waarin onderliggende tyd-afhanklike prosesse bloot aange-
neem word, van twyfelagtige waarde mag wees. Voorbeelde van analitiese formule-rings vir die
teoretiese regverdiging van herverdelingsaksies word laastens ook buite die konteks van nuts-
teorie gegee.
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1.1 Background
Rising economic inequality seems to be an inherent feature of large free markets [117]. Indeed,
economic inequality has increased over the last 150 years in both the United States of America
and the United Kingdom [91]. Extreme rises in economic inequality have also been associated
with the transition from socialist to free market systems [68, 150]. Yet, historical periods of ex-
treme inequality have been characterised by catastrophic events such as (violent) revolution [94]
or severe financial recession [77]. Furthermore, high levels of economic inequality are associated
with lower economic growth [8, 51, 108, 112]. This suggests that the current drivers of wealth
distribution in large free markets are not sustainable.
Societal inequality and the most beneficial structure of social arrangement have been deliberated
for thousands of years [41, 126, 129]. The inherent power instability in social systems is not
limited to financial matters. Unchallenged political power, which is certainly related to economic
power, also tends to become more concentrated over time [66]. Such concentration in large
adaptive systems increases fragility and the risk of large shocks [26, 141], which is one reason
why the democratic process is of value as a deterrent of such concentration.
Empirical investigations related to economic inequality and its temporal evolution have resulted
in controversial hypotheses pertaining to its dependence on development [86], its relation to
redistribution [79, 83, 90] and different means of regulation [116]. A definitive measure of in-
equality, or a means of ranking different distributions according to their relative inequality, is
required if notions of decreased or increased inequality are considered. Popular metrics of eco-
nomic inequality have, however, been shown to rank the same set of distributions differently [11].
Caution should therefore be exercised when inequality is quantified, by rigorously noting the
underlying assumptions of the quantitative metric.
1
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The mathematical modelling of systems emanating from the social sciences poses a very difficult
task for a number of reasons, including the complexity of capturing the system entity interac-
tions, the difficulty in identifying all applicable variables as well as the suitable measurement
of these variables, and the challenge of isolating natural subsystems. Discussions on and in-
vestigations of matters pertaining to societal inequality therefore tend to be philosophically or
empirically oriented. The validity of findings in such endeavours is, however, always subject to
the context in which the observations are made, and are rarely truly universal. The reason for
this phenomenon is that these observations are seldom representative of all possible behaviour,
and may furthermore be subject to various biases or measurement errors. It is therefore un-
surprising that many of the hypotheses constructed primarily on empirical investigations in
economics are disputed. In contrast, a theoretical mathematical investigation of the underlying
concepts may provide insights that are universally applicable, albeit in a highly idealised or
abstracted fashion.
If the temporal evolution of a wealth or income distribution is assumed to be unstable in the
sense that relative inequality increases over time, this implies that wealth increases faster (or
decreases slower) in the distribution at higher levels of wealth than at lower levels. Assuming
that the per capita1 growth rates dictating this temporal evolution of wealth are captured by
an increasing function of wealth is therefore one sufficient way of modelling increasing relative
inequality over time.
If this inherent instability is assumed and it is accepted that the unbounded growth of inequality
is unsustainable, then it follows that redistribution of wealth is required to render the situation
sustainable. Some redistribution is present in all governance systems [50], although the extent
of such redistribution varies substantially from system to system. The manner in which this
redistribution transpires, or ought to transpire, is not obvious. Wealth redistribution has been
described as a trickle-down process [3, 114], which is mathematically similar to the notion of
diffusion. This analogy is both elegant and satisfying since diffusion is a natural equalising force
present in many contexts. Over time, for example, a gas distributes itself at equal densities
throughout the space available. Another example is the distribution of heat in a homogeneous,
isolated material which equalises over time as a result of diffusion. Even the spread over time of a
beneficial innovation in society has been likened to diffusion [95]. Another approach to modelling
redistribution is to impose a particular functional form on wealth, such as linear tax [124, 131],
with negative rates at low wealth levels.
When dynamical systems are modelled in which component densities change over time in the
presence of diffusion, based on their distributions over space, so-called reaction-diffusion equa-
tions result. In such equations, a reaction term expresses the growth or decline of a given
component, while a diffusion term models the movement of entities modelled by the component
in the direction of decreasing density. One example of such a model is Fisher’s equation [57] for
the advance of an advantageous gene in a population, and another is the Newell-Whitehead-Segel
equation [105] describing Rayleigh-Bernard convection. A linear type of redistribution may be
modelled in a similar manner, by replacing the diffusion term with an appropriate alternative.
The reaction terms in the aforementioned models (and in most one-component reaction-diffusion
models) evaluate to zero for some positive density and are negative for all densities larger than
this, giving rise to the existence of positive, stable equilibrium states. The reader may be excused
for expecting that systems which exhibit positive growth rates for large densities (i.e. infinite
1The use of the phrase per capita here refers to the specific wealth attainment level, and not to specific entities.
Hence the product of the function evaluated at a given wealth and that wealth attainment is the average wealth
growth rate at that point in the wealth distribution, although this rate is not necessarily achieved by any individual
entity at that wealth level.
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growth over infinite time) do not exist in practice. There exist several systems that exhibit
always positive growth over time intervals of (in foresight) uncertain, and possibly considerable,
length. For example, in a well-functioning economy, interest rates (and therefore fiscal growth)
are expected to be positive, and the duration of a particular economy’s stability may be large.
It is, however, important to recognise that component densities in such systems do not grow
unbounded in finite time, but merely exceed any pre-specified density threshold when viewed
over a long enough period of time. The objection that systems in which growth allowing densities
to tend toward infinity do not exist therefore does not apply, since the phenomenon of finite-time
blow-up is inherent to this objection.
Numerous systems exist in which competing forces are at work — one tending toward increased
concentration and inequality, and the other equalising. In these systems, persistence is often
preferred over decrease, and increase over persistence. The distribution of wealth and the con-
centration of political power are two examples.
1.2 Problem description
The problem considered in this thesis involves the derivation of simple mathematical models
of wealth distribution over time based on the notion of instability as a result of increasing
per capita growth rates over wealth, and counteracting redistribution. Sufficient conditions for
bounded inequality are derived in the context of these models. Possible long-time behaviours
of solutions to these models are also investigated and potential implications of these behaviours
are interpreted in view of existing postulates in the literature on economic inequality.
1.3 Research objectives
The following seven objectives are pursued in this thesis:
I To conduct a thorough survey of the academic literature related to:
(a) The notions of inequality and redistribution with a particular focus on
(i) societal and economic inequality,
(ii) postulates related specifically to economic inequality,
(iii) the identification of suitable metrics of economic inequality, and
(iv) the modelling of wealth distribution over time.
(b) Mathematical modelling and model solution computation in the context of
(i) systems of partial differential equations (PDEs) in general, and reaction-diffusion
models in particular, and
(ii) appropriate numerical solution techniques for initial-boundary value problems
involving PDEs.
II To derive mathematical models for the temporal dynamics of the distribution of wealth,
as affected by growth and redistribution processes (one model being within the realm of
reaction-diffusion systems).
III To establish suitable metrics of inequality in the context of the models of Objective II.
IV To present sufficient conditions for decreasing inequality of wealth in the context of the
models of Objective II.
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V To analyse the temporal evolution of the inequality metrics of Objective III for simple
growth functions in the context of the models of Objective II in order to characterise the
possible behaviour of solutions with reference to relative inequality.
VI To interpret the findings of the analysis carried out in pursuit of Objective V within
a socio-economic context and to note their possible implications pertaining to existing
postulates in the literature on economic inequality.
VII To recommend sensible follow-up work related to the work documented in this thesis which
may be pursued in future.
1.4 Scope delimitation
The focus in this thesis is an investigation of the nature of change in wealth inequality over time
subject to increasing growth functions of wealth in the presence of redistribution of different
magnitudes. The implications of the investigation are interpreted in an economic context in
order to demonstrate possible applications of the insights gained, and the observations made
should therefore be viewed in this light. It is noted, however, that the implications of the
investigation may extend to other domains.
All major ethical theories for social arrangement call for equality of some variable [130]. The
word wealth is used in this thesis to refer to that variable, and the analysis conducted applies
to all spaces where the distribution of that variable is determined by entities’ ability to increase
it, as well as the extent of redistribution present. Furthermore, an entity’s ability to increase its
attainment of this variable is assumed to be proportional to its current level of attainment of
the variable. On a more abstract level than the monetary sphere, the distribution of power in a
community also satisfies these assumptions.
The purpose of the research conducted in this thesis is not to attempt to capture the complexity
of actual economies, but rather to elucidate the nature of simple concepts related to the emer-
gence of redistribution phenomena over time in a rigorous manner, albeit in a highly abstracted
context.
1.5 Thesis organisation
The second chapter of this thesis is devoted to a brief review of the academic literature related to
economic inequality and wealth distribution. First, points of view in the literature on inequality
in general and on economic inequality in particular are reviewed briefly, in order to create a
context within which economic inequality may be discussed fruitfully. Existing postulates under
three related headings, namely trends in economic inequality, the redistribution of wealth, and
the notion of optimal redistribution, are then reviewed. Metrics used to quantify the extent of
inequality of a wealth distribution are reviewed next in order to establish a context in which
the reasons for the particular choices of inequality indices used in this thesis can be elucidated.
Existing models of wealth distribution are finally reviewed so as to create a context for the
contribution of this thesis.
Certain mathematical prerequisites for following the arguments presented later in this thesis are
reviewed in the third chapter. First, a number of basic mathematical definitions are provided,
and this is followed by a very brief discussion on the subject of differential equations. A particular
class of PDEs, namely reaction-diffusion systems, is then reviewed. A method for analysing the
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stability properties of equilibrium solutions to certain differential equations is outlined next.
Numerical techniques for solution approximation are finally reviewed in the context of initial-
boundary conditions involving certain partial differential equations.
In the fourth chapter, two mathematical models for wealth distribution over time are derived.
First, the underlying model assumptions are noted and motivated, after which mathematical
derivations of the two models are presented. The choice of indices used for quantifying inequality
in this thesis is then motivated. The per capita wealth growth-rate functions to be considered in
the aforementioned models are put forward next. These per capita wealth growth-rate functions
are simple examples of functions which produce increasing relative inequality over time, and
capture certain basic economic relationships. Since the aim is to demonstrate that certain
interesting solution behaviours are possible in a very simple modelling context, the models, their
underlying assumptions and the per capita wealth growth-rate functions, are quite rudimentary.
It may be inferred that solution behaviours admitted in such extremely simple contexts are also
possible in more complicated settings. The existence and uniqueness of the models’ solutions, as
well as certain basic solution properties (such as nonnegativity of solutions) are then established.
The models’ limitations and intended use are finally discussed critically and clarified in a formal
model apology.
Sufficient conditions for bounded inequality in solutions to the models of Chapter 4 are estab-
lished in Chapter 5 by taking the time derivative of the inequality indices and seeking conditions
which ensure that these derivatives are negative. Lemmas required in the arguments of this chap-
ter are first established, after which the main results of the chapter are presented. The results
are finally illustrated in numerical examples in the penultimate section of the chapter.
The long-time behaviour of solutions to the models of Chapter 4 are considered in Chapter 6.
The presentation is structured according to the different per capita wealth growth-rate functions
in order of increasing complexity. For a simple linear per capita wealth growth rate, the relation
between solution persistence and the extent of redistribution is investigated. The stability of the
constant equilibrium solutions is established analytically, and an existence result is established
for a nonconstant equilibrium solution to one of the models. The solution behaviour of the same
model is then investigated numerically, within the context of a mean-dependent linear per capita
wealth growth-rate function. The effect of the redistribution rate on solution stability and on the
equilibrium solution size and shape is analysed. Finally, a mean and inequality-dependent linear
per capita wealth growth-rate function is considered and possible model solution behaviour is
investigated numerically within this context. The insights gained in this chapter are captured
in labelled observations, which are considered further in the following chapter.
The seventh chapter is devoted to a discussion on the findings of the analysis of Chapters 4
and 5. First, the question of model validation is considered. The expected and actual model
behaviours in the simplest cases are discussed, and one of the aims of the investigation and the
type of insights that may be gained from the investigation, are restated. Implications of some
of the findings of Chapter 6 for the so-called Robin Hood paradox are then considered. The
presence of fluctuations in economic metrics over time, and whether their presence implies the
existence of time-dependent driving processes, are then discussed. The notions of an optimal
redistribution and a theoretical justification of redistributive actions are finally considered.
The contents of this thesis is summarised in Chapter 8, and this is followed by a critical appraisal
of the contribution of this thesis. Possible avenues for future research related to the work
documented in this thesis are finally suggested.
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The literature related to economic inequality is reviewed very briefly in this chapter. First, per-
spectives are offered on inequality from the point of view of social justice and their applicability
to economic inequality is noted. Certain historical trends in economic inequality, as well as sub-
sequent theoretical postulates, are mentioned next. Instruments available for the redistribution
of resources are summarised in the section that follows and an empirical observation related
to the relationship between economic inequality and the redistribution of wealth is noted. The
notion of optimal redistribution is then reviewed, after which the measurement of economic
inequality is considered by reviewing certain classes of inequality indices. Existing models of
wealth distribution are finally introduced to provide context for the contribution of this thesis.
2.1 Inequality and social justice
The most suitable structure of social arrangement has been a topic of debate for millennia [41,
126, 129]. Part of the definition of such a structure must pertain to the distribution of resources
amongst the members of a society, and thus economic inequality is necessarily addressed in
these discussions, be it explicitly or implicitly. Perhaps the first well-known work on the subject
is Plato’s Republic [118], which suggests a rigorously state-controlled society, ruled by a so-
called philosopher king, as the most desirable form of social organisation. In such a society,
the unbounded increase of inequality is explicitly prohibited, since the extent of state control
and ownership of resources are complete, and the highest ruling authority is expected to lead a
simple life of moderation. This does not mean, however, that men are viewed as equals in all
respects. Rather, society is to be structured according to a fixed hierarchy, based on individual
inherent endowments. Politics, by Plato’s pupil Aristotle [132], was the next major contribution
to the discourse. In this work, Aristotle initially built on the ideas put forward by Plato, and
9
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although he defended the right to ownership of private property, his ideal society is still a rigid
one where one’s life is determined by position in a hierarchical structure. In both these cases
then, the extent of societal inequality, while it may seem extreme, is fixed.
The rigid structures suggested in the aforementioned ideas may remind the reader of the com-
munist regimes of Russia or China [62, 149], and with the benefit of hindsight, seem painfully
naive and impractical. It is, however, noteworthy that the earliest thinkers’ ideal societies did
not allow individuals to amass resources in an unlimited fashion.
There seems to be a shift over the ages from a strict formalistic approach to social organisation,
in conjunction with a fixed limited equality, to a more liberal view together with a far reaching
equality in human value. Prior to the aforementioned Greek philosophers, Confucian philosophy
also advocated the view that not all persons are capable of self-government and that able leaders
should control resources [120]. The notion of the universal equality of human worth is thought
to have originated with the Christian philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas [37].
During the age of enlightenment, notable contributions were made by the English philosophers
Hobbs and Locke. In his famous Leviathan, Hobbs [73] suggested that differences in individual
abilities should not necessarily correspond to different benefits in society [37]. The famous French
author and philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau offered an encompassing treatise of the origins,
the evolution and possible consequences of inequality amongst men [126]. He distinguished
between natural inequality which results from physical differences between persons, and moral
or political inequality which evolves from agreements made between men. He then argued that
natural inequality is, as the term suggests, part of the diversities of the human race, and hence
not of further philosophical interest. Moral inequality is, however, claimed to be unjustifiable.
According to Rousseau, moral inequality emerges in conjunction with the formation of society
and the ownership of property, as a result of man’s corrupted desire for the domination of others.
Ultimately this evolution of moral inequality leads to despotism, the unequal rule of society by
a single man with unparalleled wealth. Locke, in contrast, argued that the right to property
follows from labour, and in this context he defended the unbridled accumulation of wealth in
monetary form [16].
Karl Marx criticised the notion of an equal right to the ownership of property, referring to it as a
‘right to inequality’ [37]. He also described the capitalist system as fundamentally unstable and
ultimately destined to lead to revolution motivated by severe inequality [17]. His suggestions for
ensuring acceptable economic equality, however, are considered to place too great a constraint
on individual liberty [37].
Perhaps the most noteworthy recent addition to the discourse on social arrangement, from the
point of view of social justice, is due to Rawls [122]. Its primary feature is the well-known
thought experiment, entitled the original position. According to this experiment, the principles
of social justice, and therefore the most acceptable structure of a society, is to be decided by
persons unaware of their own position in this society. It is argued that, from this point of view,
an agreement will be reached which minimises the disadvantages experienced by the least well
off. Following this line of argument, two principles of justice are introduced. First, each person
should have access to the most extensive basic liberty possible, without infringing upon the
liberty of another. Secondly, the inequalities in society should be structured so that the least
advantaged derive the greatest benefit from these, and everyone should have equal opportunity
to fulfil the mandate of official positions or offices.
The first principle resonates with the ideas of capitalist free markets, while the second may
be interpreted to call for regulation and redistribution of resources. Rawls may therefore be
described as egalitarian in terms of liberty, but also, in some limited sense, in terms of resources.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
2.2. Trends in economic inequality 11
For if individual liberty alone is emphasised, inequalities which do not benefit the least well off
may (and most likely will) arise.
The argument (and empirically observed phenomenon) that some economic inequality may be
desirable since it may be associated with greater economic growth [59], which may ultimately
benefit the whole of society, may therefore be in agreement with the theory of Rawls, if it can be
shown that the poor ultimately derive the greatest benefit. This can only be the case in a free
market where some form of redistribution of resources is present when considering the history
of capitalism, and the events that unfold when it is unregulated, or worse, regulated in such a
manner that the most well off derive the greatest benefit [113].
Sen [130] emphasised that all ideologies are egalitarian in some sense, the difference being
the variable concerned (income, liberty or opportunity to hold office, for example). Moreover,
Pikkety [117] has argued that unregulated capitalism is fundamentally unstable, producing ever
increasing inequality. If this is accepted, then limited egalitarianism in terms of resource owner-
ship, in other words, forced redistribution of wealth, becomes the only way by which capitalism
may be considered sustainable, if the extent of attainable wealth is not explicitly limited. Indeed,
as has become apparent, the theme of limited egalitarianism in terms of resource ownership in
an ideal society is an old one.
2.2 Trends in economic inequality
Since accurate empirical data of individual wealth positions are typically difficult to obtain,
investigations of economic inequality have tended to focus on income inequality [49]. It is,
however, expected that a strong relationship exists between income inequality and inequality of
wealth, the difference being dictated by aggregate consumption versus saving decisions within
different population subsets [137]. In fact, it has been observed across several countries that
household-wealth inequality is proportional to yet greater than household-income inequality [49].
Kuznets famously postulated that income inequality in a developing economy will follow an
inverted ‘u’ curve [86]. First, income inequality will increase as new developments benefit some
limited subset of the population, after which it is expected to flatten as the economy becomes
more developed, giving rise to more equally spread opportunities across the population, and
ultimately steadily decrease when all compete with equal opportunity of success over time. This
may be extended to the expected inequality of wealth in a developing economy, since changes
in income inequality can be expected to result in similar changes in the inequality of wealth.
While Kuznets’ findings are empirically supported, in the sense that such an inverted ‘u’-shaped
curve exists in the income-distribution inequality of several countries analysed (specifically the
United States of America, the United Kingdom and Germany), critics have argued, and Kuznets
himself has conceded [86], that the data considered were limited, and hence that the findings
were therefore not conclusive [9]. A myriad of studies investigating this phenomenon followed
the initial publication, with most, however, failing to reject the hypothesis [5, 72, 80, 144]. For
an example of a data analysis rejecting the Kuznets hypothesis, see [9]. The fact that this claim
is still disputed is an example of the limited reach of empirical studies in validating or refuting
economic postulates.
During the period of Kuznets’ seminal publication, a decrease in income inequality was observed
in America, which has become known as the egalitarian revolution. A broader perspective on
changes in inequality has since emerged, as improved data became available, and with the benefit
of approximately half a century of insights. It has become apparent that inequality has increased
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over the past 150 years in both the United States of America and the United Kingdom [91]. It
has subsequently been suggested that rising inequality is an inherent feature of capitalism, if it
is not prevented by state intervention [117]. The extreme rise in wealth inequality experienced
in Russia, following the transition from limited personal property under socialism to a market
system, is a striking example of this [68, 150].
Pikkety [117] observed that, with the exception of the great wars and major recessions, capital
returns tend to be greater than overall economic growth. The result is that wealth continually
moves from the working class to the owners of capital, thereby accumulating in a small subset of
the population and increasing the inequality of wealth. As a remedy, the imposition of a global
wealth tax, in conjunction with very progressive income tax, has been suggested. The main
aim of these measures is to prohibit the perpetuation of increasing fortunes in small population
subsets, which persists through inheritance.
Empirical investigations on the influence of economic inequality on economic growth claim both
positive [59, 88] and negative [36] correlations with economic growth, once again highlighting
the non-universality of empirically justified claims in economics. The majority of investigations
find a negative correlation between inequality and growth [8, 51, 108, 112]. In support of this
trend it has been argued that in democratic societies, high levels of inequality result in political
instability [81] and reduced investment [7].
In conventional approaches, on the other hand, it has been argued that economic inequality
presents an incentive to work [4], and is therefore related to economic growth. This argument
only holds, however, if the extent of inequality and economic conditions are such that a person or
business can reasonably be expected to transition to higher wealth positions in the population.
With extremely high levels of inequality, a significant rise in wealth position becomes increasingly
improbable. It may therefore be concluded that inequality can stimulate economic growth if the
level of inequality is below a certain threshold, above which it starts to stifle growth.
The continual rise in economic inequality which has been observed for more than a century
furthermore shows that economic growth is often related to increasing inequality. If economic
growth results in greater inequality, then the net growth rates achieved at higher wealth levels
are greater than those achieved at lower wealth levels. It may therefore be concluded that, on
average, per capita growth rates in most economies are increasing functions of wealth.
High levels of economic inequality are undesirable for several reasons. As has been noted, income
inequality increases political instability [7] and high levels of inequality have also been associated
with lower economic growth [112]. In the absence of redistribution, the resulting rising inequality
may lead to catastrophic undesirable events such as (violent) revolution [94] or severe financial
recession [77]. Empirical history therefore leads to a conclusion similar to that of the previous
section, namely that a certain degree of redistribution is required in order to render liberal
capitalism sustainable.
Complete redistribution, even if it were practically possible, is, however, also undesirable for
several reasons. First, because growth rates increase over wealth, economic growth may be
impacted negatively through redistribution. Secondly, the act of redistribution itself is costly and
results in lost wealth, a phenomenon known as Okun’s bucket [106] (named after the economist
Arthur Okun who likened wealth redistribution to transferring water using a leaking bucket).
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2.3 The redistribution of wealth
In this section, various instruments that are at a government’s disposal for altering the wealth
distribution in an economy are reviewed. These instruments include taxation, social services
and social transfers [119]. The manner in which these might be applied is finally categorised
into two classes, depending on the parts of the wealth distribution considered when determining
transfer magnitudes.
Wealth redistribution is present in every democracy, although the extent may vary substan-
tially [50]. The provision of basic public services, such as law enforcement or public health, the
primary mandate of the democratic state, is financed primarily through taxation. These services
which theoretically contribute equally to the lives of all members of the population, are thus
not financed equally by all. This is the case even for a flat tax rate in the presence of wealth
inequality, although progressive tax is commonly employed. A very basic type of redistribution
is therefore a consequence of the provision of public services [18]. This type of redistribution is
generally accepted, as the necessity of such basic services is self-evident. The progressiveness of
taxation as a means of funding these services is, however, not generally agreed upon.
Social transfers, through the provision of some minimum income level, or by means of negative
income taxes (as suggested by Friedman [60]), or a minimum standard of living, through the
provision of non-fiscal social grants, are ways in which wealth may be transferred directly to those
at the bottom of the income or wealth distribution. Various forms of taxation are applied in
order to extract the wealth required in these transferrals, and for the provision of basic services.
Personal income tax and property tax are typically structured in brackets, with higher earners or
assets of greater value being subject to progressively larger percentages of taxation [119]. Wealth
tax, as suggested by Pikkety [117], is progressive by definition. Not all forms of taxation are,
however, necessarily progressive — corporate taxes for medium sized companies, as well as indi-
rect taxes, are often regressive [119]. It is the combination of the available tax instruments and
the characteristics of a particular economy subject to these that ultimately determine whether,
and how, redistribution takes place. It has been observed that the net effect of typical combined
taxation in developing countries tends to be regressive [65]. This means that the net effect of
taxes in these often very unequal societies is an increase in inequality, by being of greater benefit
to the wealthy rather than to the poor.
The commonly observed phenomenon that the extent of redistribution present in economically
unequal countries is substantially less than the redistribution present in more economically equal
countries is known as the Robin Hood paradox [90]. Since income and wealth distributions are
typically skewed to the left [99, 123] (the median is less than the mean), it is expected that
in the presence of a democratic process, more redistribution ought to emerge in more unequal
societies. Political economic models with egalitarian political power distributions are therefore
biased in the opposite relation than is empirically observed in wealth distributions, since the
median voter is the decisive voter in this context [99].
There are two prominent (and at times contradictory) schools of thought related to the devel-
opment of economies with different redistribution policies which give rise to the Robin Hood
paradox. These approaches are known as power resource theory [83] and varieties of capital-
ism [70]. Each of these attempts to explain the clustering of economies into two main groups.
The first is coordinated market economies, characterised by strong strong labour unions, large
welfare states (and therefore substantial redistribution of wealth) and economic equality. The
second is liberal market economies, which are characterised by fewer constraints on trade rela-
tions, small welfare states and greater levels of economic inequality.
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Proponents of power resource theory argue that political power is related to capital, and since the
concentration of monetary capital is greater than that of labour capital, the owners of monetary
capital have greater political influence than the labour class [82]. The disparity in power can
be lessened, however, through unionisation. This coordinating ability (or lack thereof) within
the labour class, drives the formation of greater welfare states through the extension of social
citizenship rights and by limiting the market options available to capitalists. The primary driver
of egalitarian processes is therefore the labour class, while capitalists may oppose, consent or at
times even support these initiatives, depending on the immediate profit implications.
In contrast, varieties of capitalism holds that welfare state formation is influenced primarily by
capitalists [79]. In industries where asset-specific skills are required, it is argued that persons
are exposed to greater unemployment (or below skill-level employment) risk. In such industries,
capitalists drive welfare state formation as a hedge against the negative financial implications
of unemployment risks, in order to encourage investment in asset-specific skills. Welfare state
formation therefore depends on national skill profiles and the transferability of skills between
industries.
The continuation of these differing views highlights the opacity of the driving processes behind
economic phenomena. This strengthens the argument for adopting an approach of analysing
possible outcomes given the presence of certain dynamics, rather than seeking to uncover the
driving forces of complex systems.
In determining exactly how wealth redistribution ought to transpire (for example, how tax
brackets, and their corresponding proportional taxation levels, should be structured) one may
distinguish between two theoretical approaches to wealth transfer. Wealth redistribution through
economic interactions has been modelled in a trickle-down fashion [3, 114], where the local dis-
tribution of wealth determines the dynamics of wealth transfers. The entire wealth distribution
is therefore not explicitly taken into account when determining local transfers, but since all
entities are connected to a certain set of “neighbours” in the wealth distribution, the entire
distribution implicitly influences the evolution of wealth transfers over time. By formulating
regulations aimed at redistributive results in this context, the trickle-down effect of wealth may
therefore be magnified or lessened.
Another approach is to impose a functional form on wealth (not dependent on the wealth
distribution itself) which dictates redistributive transfers. An example is where an entity’s net
contribution or benefit derived from the redistribution scheme depends on its wealth position
relative to some population-dependent standard (the average wealth, say). This corresponds to
a linear tax function [124, 131] which translates on the income axis according to the average
wealth.
2.4 The notion of optimal redistribution
The problem of optimal taxation, where a certain revenue is to be raised by means of taxing
income in such a manner that the decrement in utility is minimised, was first formulated analyt-
ically in 1927 by the celebrated mathematician F. P. Ramsey [121]. An entire field of economic
enquiry, still actively being pursued (see, [34, 125] for example), stemmed from this problem
formulation. This field is concerned primarily with raising the revenue required to fund social
goods in the most efficient fashion, and not with redistributive transfers which may also form
part of a tax system (although some overlap is inevitable, given the interrelation).
The notion of optimal redistribution has been formalised in a similar vein to optimal taxation,
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also by utilising utility theory. The sovereignty of the individual consumer, together with the
notion of independent utility, was central to the emergence of neoclassical public finance [29].
However, redistributive practices observed and evidently required in reality, whether informal
charity or formal government intervention, are inconsistent with the aforementioned axioms of
neoclassical public finance [74]. The lack of a theoretical justification for redistributive actions
within the theory of welfare economics was addressed in the pioneering papers [74, 107] by in-
troducing interdependent individual utility functions. In addition to the notion that a person’s
utility may be positively related to the welfare of society, security against drastic future income
fluctuations were noted as a possible motivation for the redistribution of resources. The latter
is, however, not explicitly incorporated in the analytical theory of optimal redistribution. The
triumph of this theory is its ability to demonstrate analytically that progressive taxation may
be socially optimal, consistent with the Pareto criterion1, under reasonable conceptual assump-
tions. It should be noted that interpersonal utility comparisons (which are considered to be
impossible [71]) are not required in this argument.
Mirrlees [101] extended the analytical treatment of optimal redistributive income tax, assuming
that individual utility is positively related to income and negatively related to hours worked,
and that income is a measure of an entity’s potential productivity. It was concluded that a linear
income-tax schedule (with the possibility of imposing negative tax), is optimal. Such notions
of optimality rely on a social welfare function (of individual utilities) and further assumptions
on the shape of individual utility functions, such as concavity. While these assumptions are not
necessarily unreasonable, the reliance of the arguments on utility theory and a particular social
welfare function leaves any sceptic of this branch of utility theory unconvinced — first, of the
justification of redistributive actions, and secondly, of the existence of some optimal amount of
redistribution.
Representative agent models of increasing complexity have since been developed in order to
interpret macroeconomic phenomena, make predictions and develop optimal tax structures suit-
able for application in reality. Examples of such models include [15, 24, 100, 153]. The focus
of the literature on optimal redistribution therefore departed from its original pursuit of a the-
oretical justification of a basic premise (redistribution in general and progressive taxation in
particular), to attempts at accurate modelling of complex socio-economic systems.
Stiglitz [138], among others, contributed significantly to interpreting these developments and
was instrumental in directing attention to the importance of inequality by emphasizing its far
reaching economic implications. Furman and Stiglitz [61] have stated that representative agent
models can be misleading, and that neoclassical models which assume that distribution and
efficiency are separable, are wrong in the context of the informational limitations of reality.
Such objections are unsurprising. Given the complexity of the system under consideration, the
extent of the simplifying assumptions required in order to build any model of explicit interac-
tion (heterogeneous agents choosing between consumption and saving, for example), will invite
critique, and be spurious. Furthermore, the utility framework on which most models of optimal
redistribution relies, while perhaps theoretically acceptable, is notoriously difficult to capture
empirically and apply in reality. Indeed, developing a practical theory for redistributive tax
seems to be intractable.
This review suggests that the most fruitful theoretical investigations of redistribution have been
aimed at theoretical justification, rather than practical estimates or predictions. Existing theo-
retical justifications of redistribution rely on assumptions related to utility and efficiency. This
naturally leads to the question of whether there are simpler or other assumptions upon which
1An allocation of resources is called Pareto efficient, after the Italian engineer and economist Vilfredo Pareto,
if no person can be made better off without rendering another worse off [28].
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other justifications for redistributive actions can be constructed. In other words, can redis-
tributive actions be justified in ways other than in terms of a specific version of utility theory
and perhaps even over and above the idea that redistribution is required for social stability, as
mentioned in §2.2?
2.5 Metrics of economic inequality
The predominant literature on the measurement of economic inequality distinguishes between
the statistical problem of the measurement of the inequality of a given variable describing the
distribution of some physical quantity, and the specific problem of measuring economic inequal-
ity [11, 46]. Economists are not concerned primarily with the distribution of wealth or income,
but with the distribution of welfare (and the maximisation thereof) [46]. The use of any given
measure of economic inequality implies certain assumptions about the function mapping the
distribution of wealth to that of welfare, called the social welfare function [39]. The reason
why certain implicit assumptions about a social welfare function are included in any measure of
economic inequality is that different measures differently emphasize the extent of inequality at
different points along the wealth spectrum.
Various requirements that should be satisfied by a good metric of economic inequality have been
put forward. These differ in strength and some are even contradictory. When choosing a certain
metric, its exact purpose should therefore be established carefully, and its characteristics noted
explicitly.
Certain fundamental requirements are commonly accepted. The anonymity principle [64], for
example, requires that the metric should depend on wealth only, and that permutations of
entity labels should leave it invariant. The population principle furthermore states that the
inequality metric should be independent of population size, in other words, all distributions
obtained through the replication of a certain distribution should exhibit identical inequality [46].
According to the principle of transfers, any transfer of wealth d from an entity with wealth w1
to another of wealth w2, where w1 − d > w2, should furthermore result in a decrease in the
inequality metric [46, 115]. Such a transfer is equivalent to a mean-preserving spread [11]. The
decomposability principle finally requires that if two distributionsW1 andW2 of the same size and
mean, are merged with a third distribution W3, then it should hold that I(W1,W3) > I(W2,W3),
if I(W1) > I(W2), where I is the inequality measure.
Further requirements may be imposed, depending on the particular use of the metric. For
example, conflicting viewpoints exist in respect of how an inequality metric should be influenced
by proportional increases in wealth. During a proportional increase, the distributional shape
remains unchanged, the absolute difference between entity wealth positions increases, and, if
the social welfare function is increasing over wealth (as is typically assumed [22]), the total
welfare obtained by the population is increased. These three observations may be used to
qualify assertions that a good inequality metric should be uninfluenced, increasing, or decreasing,
respectively, when subject to proportional increases in wealth.
These disputes may be resolved to some extent by distinguishing between increased equality and
increased welfare, as is done in [39], but any single quantification of a distribution’s inequality
still contains within it an assumption of the weighting of inequality within different parts of the
wealth spectrum. For example, the popular Gini coefficient weighs inequality in the tails of the
distribution less heavily than in the middle [11], while variance weighs inequality farther from
the mean more heavily. While it may be expected that mean deviation is an objective metric
in the sense that it weighs no part of the wealth spectrum more heavily in the quantification
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of inequality, it remains uninfluenced by transfers between entities on the same side of the
mean, and is therefore clearly a poor indication of the extent of inequality present in a given
distribution [46].
The principle of scale invariance [39] states that if some distribution W1(y) is considered more
equal than some other distribution W2(y), then for any constant k, W1(ky) should be more
equal than W2(ky). The principle of translation invariance [38], however, states that if some
distribution W1(y) is considered more equal than a distribution W2(y), then for any constant k,
W1(y + k) should be more equal than W2(y + k). Except in trivial cases, these two principles
cannot hold simultaneously.
Adopting the principle of scale invariance, together with the commonly accepted principles
mentioned above, implies that a continuous inequality metric must be ordinally equivalent to
IGE(y) =
1
s(s− 1)
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
[
yi
µ(y)
]s
− 1
]
, (2.1)
where µ is the mean wealth, distributed between n entities, and s ∈ R is a parameter which
determines the metric’s sensitivity to inequalities at different positions in the wealth distribu-
tion [38]. For positive or negative values of s, the metric is more sensitive to changes at the top
or bottom of the wealth distribution, respectively. This class of measures is referred to as the
class of generalised entropy measures [40], and is an important subclass of the class of relative
inequality measures [22].
Choosing to adopt the principle of translation invariance instead of that of scale invariance gives
rise to the class of continuous inequality indices
IA(y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
es[yi−µ(y)] − 1, (2.2)
when s, the sensitivity parameter, is nonzero, or
IA(y) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[yi − µ(y)]2 (2.3)
when s = 0, which is simply the variance. These indices reside in the class of absolute inequality
measures [21].
The most commonly used metric of economic inequality, the Gini coefficient [39], is defined by
IGini(y) =
1
2n2µ(y)
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|yi − yj |. (2.4)
This measure is similar to the relative measures, but requires that the decomposition principle
be relaxed in the sense that the arbitrarily introduced distribution does not overlap with the
initial distributions [38].
The most intuitive interpretation of the Gini coefficient is that it represents the area between a
given distribution’s Lorenz curve2 and the line of total equality. The curve represents the pro-
portion of total wealth belonging to a given bottom proportion of the population, as illustrated
in Figure 2.1.
2The Lorenz curve is widely used in the calculation of inequality indices [64]. It is defined implicitly by
L(F ) =
1
µ
∫ y1
0
yf(y) dy, F =
∫ y1
0
f(y) dy, (2.5)
where f is the density distribution of wealth.
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Figure 2.1: The Lorenz curve depicts the proportion of total wealth x′ owned by the bottom proportion
x of the population which, in a completely equal population, is equal to x.
The assumption that marginal economic welfare decreases as wealth position increases is com-
monly accepted, and leads to the conclusion that greater equality leads to greater total wel-
fare [46]. Here, therefore, lies another motivation for seeking greater equality in wealth distri-
bution, highlighting the importance of investigating various redistribution techniques. Finding
a universally accepted social welfare function, however, proves difficult because of the diversity
of human preference and opinion [130].
The focus in this thesis is on the effects that certain redistribution schemes have on a wealth
distribution, and not primarily on the welfare resulting from the wealth distribution. The
precise sensitivity weighting of a given inequality metric, which is related to the shape of the
social welfare function, is therefore not of primary importance. The distinction between absolute
and relative indices is, however, of fundamental importance, since the concern in this thesis is an
analysis of changes in distributional shape, rather than absolute differences. Since the primary
intention is to differentiate between upward or downward trends in the evolution of relative
inequality, any metric of relative inequality will therefore suffice, since the exact choice only
influences the rate of change, for finite sensitivity parameters.
2.6 Existing models of wealth distribution
If models describing the evolution of wealth distribution were arranged along a linear spec-
trum with models which mimic reality by modelling economic interactions explicitly (a so-called
bottom-up approach) on the extreme left, and models which simply map distributional dy-
namics over time directly using functions which reproduce certain characteristics of observed
distributional changes (a so-called top-down approach) on the extreme right, then the present
investigation would fall towards the right-hand side of most existing models in the literature.
The prevailing models of wealth distribution aim at explaining the driving forces behind the
emergence of certain wealth distributions, subject to various growth and redistributive assump-
tions. The aim in this thesis, however, is the investigation of different redistributive effects upon
a given wealth distribution, given that certain inherent characteristics of wealth-distribution
dynamics, and specifically increases in inequality, are present.
This distinction is the reason for the adoption of a greater degree of abstraction, or expressions
farther removed from reality, in the present work. Another implication is that a review of existing
models will contribute little to the argument of this thesis. A brief review of the existing models
is nevertheless included to establish context.
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Models of wealth distribution may be categorised broadly into two categories. The aim in the
first category is to find functional descriptions of the shape of empirically observed wealth dis-
tributions, so that, once a certain parameter set has been estimated, reasonable approximations
can be obtained for the distribution shape and the level of inequality. Examples of such models
include the Pareto models [109, 110, 111], the lognormal model [43], the two-parameter logistic
model [33, 58], the Pearson Type V model [12, 147] and the Dagum models [44, 45].
The aim in the second category is to reproduce certain distribution shapes (characterised by
the distribution functions of the first category) in the steady state solutions of the models by
modelling economic interactions over time, either in continuous or discretised spaces.
In the model of Hugget [75], Aiyagari [6] and Bewley [19], the wealth distribution of a continuum
of infinite households is, for instance, modelled over discrete time. The evolution of household
income is exogenously described, and households choose between consumption and saving by
maximising a given utility function. In the treatment by Hugget [75], each agent receives an
endowment of one perishable consumption good during each of an infinite number of successive
time periods, which is either high or low, denoted by eh or e`, respectively. An individual agent’s
endowment follows a Markov process with stationary transition probabilities pi(e′|e) which are
independent of all other agents’ current or historical endowments. Each agent’s preferences for
consumption is defined by the utility function
E
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct)
]
, β ∈ (0, 1),
where E denotes expectation, u(ct) is the utility derived from consumption ct during perdiod t,
β is the utility discount factor and
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ , σ > 1.
Here the parameter σ determines the rate of diminishing marginal utility.
An entity has access to a credit balance a which entitles the agent to a goods during the current
period. By paying a′q during the current period, an agent gains a′ units for the following period,
where q is the price of next-period credit balances. A limit is imposed on credit balances, denoted
by a > a where a < 0.
Each agent’s decision problem is then
v(x; q) = max
(c,a′)∈Γ (x;q)
u(c) + β
∑
e′
v(a′, e′; q)pi(e′|e),
where the period budget constraint is given by
Γ (x; q) = {(c, a′) : c+ a′q ≤ a+ e, c ≥ 0, a′ ≥ a}.
This model has also been translated to the continuous time domain for greater ease of analysis [2].
The great mathematician Benoit Mandelbrot, drew the attention of economists to the principles
of statistical mechanics (such as the mathematical description of the aggregate movement of
colliding gas particles), by highlighting similarities between the fields of statistical physics and
macro economics [97]. A vast body of literature has since emerged, building on such similarities,
within a field now referred to as econophysics [52]. In models within this realm, economic
agents are often likened to individual gas particles. Collisions between agents constitute possible
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transactions between them which follow certain trade rules. These assumptions give rise to
a spatially homogeneous Boltzman equation3 [52] which models economic characteristics of a
continuum of agents. The effects of different wealth conservation assumptions, based on the types
of market risk included, or of different saving propensities between agents, have, for example,
been investigated [35].
Models originating from biological mathematics, and specifically the well-known Lotka-Volterra
models4 of population growth and interspecies interaction, have also inspired different models of
wealth distribution within the field of economics [20, 96, 128, 135]. Models aimed specifically at
reproducing certain distribution shapes, and modelling their evolution over time, typically have
a finite number of agents whose individual wealth levels evolve randomly (according to some
assumed distribution), but with each receiving a minimum wealth dependent on the average
population wealth, and with competition limiting the growth of the wealthiest individuals, based
on their individual wealth levels and the population average wealth level [96]. Such models
approach generalised Lotka-Volterra models for large numbers of agents, and have been shown
to produce Pareto distributions [134].
Inspiration has therefore been drawn from utility theory, physics and biological mathematics,
in the pursuit of describing the distribution of wealth in an economy. Certain reservations
pertaining to these models, and econometric models in general, have also been voiced [48, 56,
87, 102]. For example, the belief that empirical regularities should exist in several areas of
economic activity, and that certain shortcomings are inherent to modelling transactions, leading
to the confusion of basic concepts, have been criticised [63].
Many of these criticisms stem from the apparent inability of proposed models to produce accurate
predictions [102]. The purpose of modelling need not necessarily be prediction, however — it
may be the illumination of core dynamics, a search for new questions and/or the promotion of
a scientific habit of mind [53].
The aim of wealth distribution models encountered in the literature is therefore to describe and
reproduce empirically observed distribution shapes. The models pursued in this thesis, on the
other hand, are related to economic reality only in the sense of allowing the increase of relative
inequality over time — no other direct relation to existing or historic wealth distributions is
sought. The aim is simply to derive high-level conceptual insights, thus avoiding direct relations
between empirical controversies and refraining from attempts to model interactions explicitly.
2.7 Chapter summary
The discourse on economic inequality was reviewed very briefly in this chapter from the point of
view of social justice, and the recurring theme of limited egalitarianism in terms of resource own-
ership was identified. Empirically observed historic trends in economic inequality, and certain
resulting postulates, were then described. The notion of redistribution of wealth was briefly re-
viewed by discussing various means of redistribution, the desirability thereof, and its relationship
to economic inequality. The notion of optimal redistribution and the theoretical justification of
redistributive acts were then considered. The measurement of economic inequality was discussed
3The spatially homogeneous Boltzman equation [104] is defined by ∂w/∂t = Q(w) where w is a time-dependent
probability density for the velocities of particles of a dilute gas, and Q is a collision operator which captures the
dynamics of colliding particle interactions according to certain collision assumptions.
4Lotka-Volterra models are systems of coupled ordinary differential equations which describe the evolution
of interacting species’ population sizes over time, such as the predator-prey model [42] dw1/dt = aw1 − bw2,
dw2/dt = cw1w2−dw2, where w1 and w2 denote the prey and predator population densities at time t, respectively,
and a, b, c and d denote constants of proportionality.
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next and two important classes of indices for measuring inequality were reviewed. Existing mod-
els of wealth distribution were finally reviewed briefly and the aim of this thesis was elucidated
within the context of the literature review presented in this chapter.
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Certain mathematical definitions, theorems and techniques required to follow the arguments
presented later in this thesis are reviewed in this chapter. First, basic definitions and theorems
often used in the calculus of functions of real variables and in the proofs presented later in
this thesis, are reviewed. A brief background is then provided on differential equations and
their solution properties, and this is followed by a description of a well-known classification
of second-order linear PDEs. Examples of equations from a specific subclass of these PDEs,
namely the class of reaction-diffusion equations, are then provided, and this is followed by
a review of an existence and uniqueness result for initial-boundary value problems involving
reaction-diffusion equations. A method for determining the stability properties of equilibrium
solutions to certain differential equations is reviewed next. Finally, numerical techniques that
are utilised to approximate solutions to differential equations are noted and the class of finite
difference methods, in particular, is described, as these methods are applied extensively later in
this thesis.
3.1 Mathematical definitions
In this section, certain prerequisite mathematical definitions are provided which will prove useful
later in the exposition of this thesis. The definition of a vector space is the chosen point
of departure. First, the notions of addition, scalar multiplication, and equality are, however,
considered in the context of vectors. Recall that a vector of dimension n is an ordered set of n
numbers.
Definition 3.1 (Addition, scalar multiplication and equality [152, p. 298])
Let a = [a1, a2, . . . , an] and b = [b1, b2, . . . , bn] be two vectors of length n ∈ N. Then
(i) a+ b = [a1 + b1, a2 + b2, . . . , an + bn] (addition),
23
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(ii) ka = [ka1, ka2, . . . , kan], for each k ∈ R (scalar multiplication), and
(iii) a = b if and only if a1 = b1, a2,= b2, . . . , an = bn (equality).
The notion of a vector space may be defined in terms of the aforementioned operations.
Definition 3.2 (Vector space [152, p. 327])
Let V be a set of elements on which the operations of vector addition and scalar multiplication
are defined, and let a, b and c be any elements of V. Then V is a vector space if, for vector
addition, it holds that
(i) a+ b ∈ V,
(ii) a+ b = b+ a,
(iii) (a+ b) + c = a+ (b+ c),
(iv) there is a unique vector 0 ∈ V such that 0 + a = a+ 0 = a,
(v) there exists a vector −a ∈ V such that a+ (−a) = (−a) + a = 0,
and, for scalar multiplication, it holds that
(vi) k1a ∈ V for each k1 ∈ R,
(vii) k1(a+ b) = k1a+ k1b for each k1 ∈ R,
(viii) (k1 + k2)a = k1a+ k2a for each pair k1, k2 ∈ R,
(ix) k1(k2a) = (k1k2)a for each pair k1, k2 ∈ R,
(x) 1a = a.
It is necessary to be able to express the relative size of a vector, or more importantly, the size
of the difference between vectors, in order to define notions such as continuity and convergence.
Functions called norms are employed for this purpose.
Definition 3.3 (A norm on a vector space [92, p. 121])
A real-valued function p defined on a vector space V is called a norm if
(i) p(a) > 0 whenever a 6= 0,
(ii) p(k1a) = |k1|p(a) for any k1 ∈ R, and
(iii) p(a+ b) ≤ p(a) + p(b),
for all a, b ∈ V.
If p is a norm defined on a vector space V and a ∈ V, then it is common to denote the value of
p(a) by ‖a‖. The most commonly used norms in Rn are ‖a‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |ai|, the Euclidean norm
‖a‖2 =
(
n∑
i=1
a2i
)1/2
,
and ‖a‖∞ = maxi{|ai|} [92]. The vector spaces employed in this thesis include the infinite
dimensional vector space of continuous real-valued functions defined on a real interval, say
[λa, λb]. The most commonly used norms (according to [92]) on this particular vector space are
the 1-norm
‖h‖1 =
∫ λb
λa
|h(λ)|dλ, (3.1)
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the 2-norm
‖h‖2 =
(∫ λb
λa
|h(λ)|2 dλ
) 1
2
, (3.2)
and the uniform norm
‖h‖∞ = max{|h(λ)| : λa ≤ λ ≤ λb}, (3.3)
where h is a continuous real-valued function defined on the interval [λa, λb]. These are special
cases of the p-norm
‖h‖p =
(∫
V
|h|p du
) 1
p
,
where h is a real-valued function defined on a vector space V and u is a measure of V. The set of
all real-valued functions with finite p-norms on a given region is denoted by the symbol Lp [143].
More specifically, the set Lp(V,D) denotes all functions defined on V mapping to D with finite
p-norms (the limit as p → ∞ is also allowed). The space L∞ on a region of interest therefore
includes all real-valued functions for which the integrals of the functions over the region are
defined and the functions are bounded on the region.
The prerequisites for defining the notion of a limit in the context of multivariate functions have
now been reviewed.
Definition 3.4 (Limits for functions of multiple variables [92, p. 126])
If a real-valued function w is defined on a subset V of Rn, then the limit lima→bw(a) = L means
that there exists, for any  > 0, a corresponding δ > 0 such that |w(a) − L| <  if a ∈ V and
0 < ‖b− a‖ < δ.
A function is continuous at a point if its limit exists there, the function itself is defined at the
point, and the function and its limit at the point are equal. This notion is made more precise
in the following definition.
Definition 3.5 (Continuity of a real-valued function on a vector space [92, p. 126])
Let h be a real-valued function defined on a vector space V on which a norm ‖ · ‖ is defined. The
function h is called continuous at a point a ∈ V if there exists a δ > 0 for every  > 0 such that
‖b− a‖ < δ implies that |h(b)− h(a)| < .
If a function is continuous at all points in some set, then it is called continuous on that set [127].
A strong type of continuity, often used in the proofs of existence and uniqueness results for
solutions to ordinary differential equations (ODEs) and PDEs, known as Lipschitz continuity, is
defined as follows.
Definition 3.6 (Lipschitz continuity [54, p. 205])
A real-valued function h is Lipschitz continuous on a vector space V on which a norm ‖ · ‖ is
defined if there exists a positive constant Lh so that
|h(b)− h(a)| ≤ Lh‖b− a‖, (3.4)
for all a, b ∈ V.
It is important to note that a function may be locally Lipschitz continuous, yet not globally
Lipschitz continuous. For example, the function h(λ) = λ2 is not Lipschitz continuous on R,
but it is Lipschitz continuous on any bounded interval [λa, λb] ∈ R.
The notion of a derivative plays an important role in the models put forward later in this thesis.
Before the concept of a derivative can be made precise, however, the notion of a linear function
is required.
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Definition 3.7 (Linear function [127, pp. 296–297])
A real-valued function ` defined on a vector space V is linear if
`(k1a+ k2b) = k1`(a) + k2`(b),
for all a, b ∈ V and k1, k2 ∈ R.
Definition 3.8 (The derivative of a real-valued function [127, p. 312])
If h is a real-valued function on a vector space V and a is an interior point of V, then h is
differentiable if there exists a linear functional ` on V with the property that there exists a δ > 0
for every  > 0 where ‖a− c‖ < δ implies c ⊂ V such that
|h(b)− h(a)− `(b− a)| ≤ ‖b− a‖.
The functional ` is called the derivative of h at a and is denoted by h′(a). If the derivative of h
exists at a, the function h is said to be differentiable at a.
The mean value theorem for a real-valued function will be required later in the derivation of
numerical approximation schemes for differential equations.
Theorem 3.1 (Mean value theorem [127, p. 344])
Let h be a real-valued function on a vector space V and let a, b be interior points in V. If
(1 − α)a + αb are interior points of V for all α ∈ (0, 1) and if h is differentiable at all these
points, then there exists a point c = (1− α0)a+ α0b for some α0 ∈ (0, 1) such that
h(b)− h(a) = h′(c)(b− a).
If a derivative of a real-valued function of more than one variable is taken with respect to one
of these variables, a partial derivative is obtained.
Definition 3.9 (Partial derivative [78, pp. 395–396])
If h is a real-valued function defined on a vector space V then for a ∈ V the partial derivative
with respect to the m-th entry of a is defined as
∂h
∂am
= lim
δ→0
h(a1, . . . , am + δ, . . . , an)− h(a1, . . . , am, . . . , an)
δ
.
A function is called differentiable on a set if its derivative exists everywhere in the set. If the
derivative of a function is continuous, the function is called continuously differentiable. The class
of all continuous functions on a given region of interest is denoted by C0, with Cm representing
the set of all m-times continuously differentiable functions on the region.
The functions to be considered in this thesis are real-valued functions of two variables. The
relationship between the integral and the partial derivative of a continuous function of two
variables is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 (The fundamental theorem of the calculus [136, pp. 312–315])
If w(λ, t) is a continuous real-valued function on [λa, λb]× [ta, tb], then the function h defined by
h(λ, t) =
∫ λ
λa
w(v, λ) dv, λa ≤ λ ≤ λb, ta ≤ t ≤ tb
is continuous on [λa, λb]× [ta, tb], the partial derivative of h with respect to λ exists on (λa, λb)×
[ta, tb] and is given by ∂h/∂λ = w(λ, t).
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Furthermore, ∫ λb
λa
w(λ, t) dλ = h(λb, t)− h(λa, t).
When one variable in a real-valued function of two variables is fixed, a real-valued function of a
single real variable is obtained. Points where the first derivative of such a function evaluate to
zero, or does not exist, are called critical points [136].
Theorem 3.3 (Second derivatives at critical points [136, pp. 198–202])
Let h(λ) be a continuously differentiable real-valued function on a real interval D. Then the
second-derivative of h is negative (positive) at critical points with zero first derivatives which are
local maxima (minima).
A theorem commonly used in the computational approximation of function values, known as
Taylor’s Theorem [30], is considered next. This theorem is presented here specifically in the
form required to approximate a real-valued function of two variables in the direction of one of
the variables.
Theorem 3.4 (Taylor’s theorem [30, pp. 10–11])
For any continuous, n + 1 times differentiable real-valued function w on [λa, λb] × [ta, tb], and
λ, λ+ δ ∈ [λa, λb], t ∈ [ta, tb],
w(λ, t+δ) = w(λ, t)+δ
∂w(λ, t)
∂t
+
δ2
2!
∂2w(λ, t)
∂t2
+· · ·+ δ
(n)
(n)!
∂nw(λ, t)
∂tn
+
δ(n+1)
(n+ 1)!
∂w(n+1)(λ, t)
∂tn+1
(t+αδ)
for some α ∈ [0, 1].
When function approximations are made, the size of the error is often denoted using so-called
Big O notation. This notation is defined as follows.
Definition 3.10 (Big O notation [13])
Let h and w be real-valued functions defined on an interval of real numbers [λa, λb]. Then the
notation h(λ) = O(w(λ)) means that for all λ ∈ [λa, λb] there exists a positive constant k1 such
that |h(λ)| ≤ k1|w(λ)|.
An important relationship between the integral of a function squared and the square of the
integral of the function will be of interest later in this thesis. With a view to establishing such
a relationship, a theorem on inner products within real vector spaces is quoted. First, however,
the notion of the inner product of two vectors is recounted.
Definition 3.11 (The inner product of two vectors [136, p. 824])
Let a and b be two vectors of length n, then the inner product of a and b is
a · b = a1b1 + a2b2 + · · ·+ anbn.
Theorem 3.5 (Cauchy-Buniakovskii-Schwarz inequality [127, p. 202])
If V is a real vector space and · is an inner product defined on V, then
|h · g| ≤
√
(h · h)(g · g),
for any h, g ∈ V.
An inner product may be defined on the space of continuous real-valued functions by
h · g =
∫ λb
λa
hg.
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It therefore follows that the integral of a real-valued function squared is at least as large as the
square of the integral of the function. This inequality is stated mathematically as follows.
Corollary 3.1 If h is a real-valued function of a real variable on the interval [λa, λb], then[∫ λb
λa
h(λ) dλ
]2
≤
∫ λb
λa
h2(λ) dλ.
3.2 Differential equations
A very brief overview of the extensive field of differential equations is provided in this section.
The primary focus is placed on concepts and theorems that will be of use at a later stage in this
thesis. This particular need dictates the composition of this section.
A mathematical equation defines a relation between a given set of variables. A differential
equation is an equation which contains the derivatives of at least one function, often called the
dependent variable, with respect to at least one independent variable [152].
If the derivatives in such an equation are all ordinary derivatives with respect to the same
independent variable, the equation is called an ODE. When partial derivatives with respect
to at least two independent variables are, however, present, the equation is called a PDE. A
differential equation is considered linear if it contains only linear combinations of the dependent
variable and its derivatives, with the coefficients being either constants or functions of the
independent variables only [23]. The order of a differential equation, ordinary or partial, is the
highest order derivative present in the equation.
An n-th order linear ODE is therefore an equation of the form
ξn(t)
dnw
dtn
+ · · ·+ ξ2(t)d
2w
dt2
+ ξ1(t)
dw
dt
+ ξ0(t)w = h(t), (3.5)
where ξn is not identically zero, and ξi = ξi(t) is a (possibly constant) function of the independent
variable t for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}. A second order linear PDE involving two independent variables
is an equation of the form
ξ1(λ, t)
∂2w
∂λ2
+ ξ2(λ, t)
∂2w
∂λ∂t
+ ξ3(λ, t)
∂2w
∂t2
+ ξ4(λ, t)
∂w
∂λ
+ ξ5(λ, t)
∂w
∂t
+ ξ6(λ, t)w = h(λ, t). (3.6)
If h is identically zero in (3.5) or (3.6), these equations are said to be homogeneous [152].
A solution to a differential equation on a given region is any function which, if substituted into
the equation, reduces it to an identity on that region. If a solution to an n-th order differential
equation is n times continuously differentiable, the solution is called a classical solution, as
opposed to a weak solution for which the derivatives of order n or smaller may not all exist, but
which nonetheless satisfies the differential equation in some predefined sense [55]. For example,
in applications, PDEs are sometimes solved on irregularly shaped domains (consider the internal
strain in an irregularly shaped mechanical component subject to various forces), which do not
necessarily have smooth boundaries, and so function derivatives may therefore not be defined
everywhere, yet the quantity modelled by the dependent variable necessarily has a solution on
the domain.
If a solution is defined on a real interval [t0, ta) and a solution exists on [t0, ta+δ), for some δ > 0,
which coincides with the solution on [t0, ta), then the solution on [t0, ta) is called continuable [69].
A solution which is not continuable is called noncontinuable.
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Another way of defining the solution to a differential equation is as the primitive which gives
rise to the differential equation. A primitive is an equation, involving n essentially arbitrary
constants, which establishes a relation between variables [14]. Using differentiation and back-
substitution, a primitive may be transformed into a differential equation. Substituting a prim-
itive into its corresponding differential equation therefore gives rise to an identity, as required
by the first definition.
Not all differential equations can be solved analytically [133]. This may not only be because
ingenuity fails, but may also be because the solutions to some differential equations cannot
be expressed in terms of standard functions. Analytic methods exist for obtaining solutions
to certain classes of differential equations. For example, linear ODEs of the form (3.5) with
constant coefficients ξ0, . . . , ξn may be solved by means of the substitution w = e
mt (where
t is the independent variable) so as to obtain a polynomial equation in m. The roots of the
polynomial equation may then be used to construct a general solution to the ODE (see, for
example, [152]). If it is expected that a solution to a PDE in two independent variables is a
product of two functions of single variables, the solution may be obtained by separating these
functions to different sides of the equation, thus obtaining two ODEs which may be solved
separately to find a general solution to the PDE [23].
For a solution to a differential equation to be unique, however, the values of all the essentially
arbitrary constants in the primitive need to be fixed. This may be achieved by specifying
conditions, such as a set of initial values, that the solution to an equation of the form (3.5)
must satisfy at some value t = ta. The equation (3.5) together with these initial conditions is
collectively referred to as an initial value problem. An initial-value problem is considered well
posed if a unique solution to the problem exists and this solution depends continuously on the
initial data [31]. For example, a first order ODE of the form
dw
dt
= h(w, t) (3.7)
requires a single initial condition, according to the following theorem, in order to admit a unique
solution.
Theorem 3.6 (Uniqueness of solutions to first order ODE initial-value problems [152])
Let R be a rectangular region in t and w that contains a point (t0, w0). If h and ∂h/∂w are
continuous in R, then there exits an interval I centred on t0, in which a unique function w(t)
satisfies (3.7).
It can be shown that a solution to the initial-value problem
dw
dt
= h(w, t) (3.8)
w(t0) = w0 (3.9)
is bounded on a small interval containing t0 if the function h is continuous.
Theorem 3.7 (Boundedness of the solution to (3.8)–(3.9) [27])
Any solution to the initial-value problem (3.8)–(3.9) is bounded on [t0, t0 + Tmax], for some
Tmax > 0, if h is continuous on [t0, t0 + Tmax].
Similar results pertaining to the existence, uniqueness and boundedness of solutions to initial-
boundary value problems involving PDEs are considerably more complex than in the case of
ODEs. The solution techniques and theorems on properties of solutions applicable to PDEs also
differ depending on the specific class of PDEs under consideration. Second-order linear PDEs
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may be classified into four distinct classes [23]. Consider the second-order linear PDE in two
dependent variables,
ξ1
∂2w
∂λ2
+ ξ2
∂2w
∂λ∂t
+ ξ3
∂2w
∂t2
+ ξ4
∂w
∂λ
+ ξ5
∂w
∂t
+ ξ6w = h(λ, t), (3.10)
where w and h are continuous functions of two real variables λ and t, ξj is a constant for all
j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and ξ21 + ξ22 + ξ23 > 0. There exists a transformation of variables
x = k1λ+ k2t,
y = −k2λ+ k1t, and
W (x, y) = p−1ek3λ+k4tw(λ, t),
where k1, k2, k3, k4 and p 6= 0 are constants with k21 + k22 = 1, so that (3.10) takes the form of
one of the following cases [23]:
(a) if ξ22 − 4ξ1ξ3 > 0, the equation is called hyperbolic,
(b) if ξ22 − 4ξ1ξ3 < 0, the equation is called elliptic,
(c) if ξ22 − 4ξ1ξ3 = 0 and 2ξ3ξ4 6= ξ2ξ5 or 2ξ1ξ5 6= ξ2ξ4, the equation is called parabolic,
(d) if ξ22 − 4ξ1ξ3 = 0, 2ξ3ξ4 = ξ2ξ5 and 2ξ1ξ5 = ξ2ξ4, the equation is called degenerate.
The PDEs to be considered in this thesis are of the parabolic type. Parabolic PDEs typically
involve a first order derivative with respect to a single real variable representing time (the inde-
pendent variable), and second order derivatives with respect to a set of real variables modelling
space [133]. The simplest example from this class is the so-called heat equation
∂w
∂t
= kd
∂2w
∂λ2
, (3.11)
where kd is a constant denoting the diffusion rate. The heat equation models the spatial spread-
ing of heat in a homogeneous material in one spatial dimension λ ∈ [λa, λb] over time t.
3.3 Reaction-diffusion systems
A class parabolic PDEs, known as reaction-diffusion equations, contains equations of the form [84]
∂w
∂t
= g(w) +D∇w, (3.12)
where ∇ denotes the Laplacian operator1 and where w = w(λ, t) is an m-column vector of
real-valued functions of time t ∈ [0,∞) on some spatial domain λ ∈ D. The second term on the
right-hand side of (3.12), called the diffusion term, models the movement of components of w
from areas of high density to areas of lower density. The matrix D is an m×m diagonal matrix
containing a diffusion rate di as its i-th entry, for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}. The first term on the
right-hand side of (3.12) is called the reaction term, and it models the growth or decline of the
components of w. In general, this growth or decline may depend on the different component
densities, the position in space, and time, such that g = g(w, t,λ). In all the cases considered
in this thesis, however, the equation form (3.12) is sufficient.
1The Laplacian operator is a differential operator defined as ∇ ≡∑ni=1 ∂2∂λ2i on Rn [23, p. 341].
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Reaction-diffusion equations arise in a variety of applications. The spatio-temporal evolution
of chemical reactions [146], or of biological species population densities [32], are two notable
examples. The simplest instance of such an equation is the single component case, known as
the Kolmogorov-Petrovskii-Piskounov equation [93]. Fisher’s equation [57],
∂w
∂t
= w(1− w) + d∂
2w
∂λ2
, (3.13)
proposed as a model for the advance of an advantageous gene in a population of density w =
w(λ, t) at time t and at position λ within a one-dimensional spatial domain, is an example from
this class.
An excellent illustration of how equations of mathematically similar form may arise in unrelated
fields is found here. If the reaction term in (3.13) is modified to w(1−w2), the so-called Newell-
Whitehead-Segel equation [105] is obtained, which models convection in a plane of liquid which
is heated from below.
As mentioned in §3.2, certain conditions are to be specified in order to guarantee that a so-
lution to a differential equation is unique, if it exists. Reaction-diffusion equations model the
spatio-temporal evolution of certain component densities, and for a unique solution to exist, the
characteristics of the solution on the spatial domain’s boundaries must be specified, as well as
the initial density distributions. These conditions are referred to as the boundary- and initial-
conditions, respectively. A parabolic PDE, together with initial and boundary conditions, is
referred to as an initial-boundary value problem.
The initial condition is simply a function or set of functions defined on the spatial domain
which maps each position in space to Rn, corresponding to the initial density of each of n
components. For some domain D with boundary ∂D, linear boundary conditions specify a
linear relationship between the dependent variable w and its partial derivatives of lesser order
than that of the differential equation considered [76]. For a second order PDE, several types
of boundary conditions may therefore be imposed. If the dependent variable value w at the
boundary is specified, the boundary conditions are called Dirichlet conditions. If the derivative
of w with respect to the normal direction on the boundary is specified, the boundary conditions
are referred to as Neuman conditions. When the value of the derivative of w with respect to the
unit normal on the boundary, as well as the function value w, is specified on the boundary, the
boundary conditions are called Cauchy boundary conditions. A weighted combination of Neuman
and Dirichlet conditions is called Robin boundary conditions. It is also possible to specify different
boundary conditions on different subsets of the domain boundary, and conditions of this is type
are referred to as mixed boundary conditions.
Existence and uniqueness of solutions to certain classes of initial-boundary value problems in-
volving reaction-diffusion systems have been established in the literature. Morgan [103], for
example, considered m-component systems of the form
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= g(w(λ, t)) +D∇w(λ, t), λ ∈ D, t > 0, (3.14)
B.C. Bw(λ, t) = 0, λ ∈ ∂D, t > 0, (3.15)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ), λ ∈ D, (3.16)
where D is a bounded domain in Rn with smooth boundary ∂D, D is a positive m×m diagonal
matrix and g : Rm 7→ Rm is locally Lipschitz. Furthermore, B is the diagonal operator
Biwi = τiwi + β
∂wi
∂η
, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, (3.17)
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where ∂/∂η denotes the derivative with respect to the outward unit normal on ∂D, τ =
[τ1, . . . , τm] ∈ Rm+ and β ∈ {0, 1}. If the conditions
(i) if β = 0 implies that τi = 1 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, or if τi = 0 for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
implies that τ ≡ 0 and β = 1, and
(ii) w0 ∈ L∞(D,Rm)
hold, then local existence and uniqueness of solutions to (3.14)–(3.16) is guaranteed by the
following result [103].
Theorem 3.8 (Existence and uniqueness of solutions to (3.14)–(3.16) [103])
If conditions (i) and (ii) hold, then there exists a real number Tmax > 0 and an m-component
function N ∈ C([0, Tmax),Rm) such that (6.1)–(6.22) has a unique, classical, noncontinuable
solution w(λ, t) on D × [0, Tmax) and ||wi(·, t)||∞ ≤ Ni(t) on D for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and
t ∈ [0, Tmax). Furthermore, if Tmax <∞, then ||wi(·, t)||∞ →∞ on D for some i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
3.4 Stability of equilibria
Many of the differential equations considered in this thesis contain a first order derivative with
respect to time. An equilibrium solution or steady state solution to such a differential equation
refers to a solution that is constant over time. An equilibrium solution is therefore any solution
for which the time derivative is identically zero. An equilibrium solution may be classified as
either stable or unstable. It is stable if solutions which are in some sense close to the equilibrium
solution remain close to the equilibrium solution for all time [133]. Certain variations in the
precise definition are possible, depending on how the notions of closeness and remaining close
are defined. A method for defining and determining the stability of equilibrium solutions to
certain non-linear PDEs (as outlined in [47]), of which the equations considered in this thesis
are special cases, is outlined in this section.
Suppose a non-linear PDE ∂w/∂t = F (w), together with boundary conditions, has an equi-
librium solution we satisfying F (we) = 0, and let w˜ represent a perturbation from we. The
evolution of w˜ over time is governed by ∂w˜/∂t = F (we + w˜), since ∂we/∂t = 0. The former
equation, together with the boundary conditions, is called the non-linear stability problem. This
problem may be approximated by a linear problem if it is assumed that the perturbation is
sufficiently small. Let w˜ = v, where  is a positive real number representing the amplitude of
the initial perturbation. Then,
F (we + v) = F (we) + Lv +O(),
where L is a linear operator which represents F (w) evaluated at w = we and O() represents
all terms of order smaller than . If a solution to the linear perturbation equation
∂v
∂t
= Lv (3.18)
together with the boundary conditions (which may also be linearised if necessary) grows un-
bounded, then we is unstable; otherwise it is stable. If the solutions to (3.18) together with the
(possibly linearised) boundary conditions decay to zero over time, then we is called asymptoti-
cally stable.
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3.5 Numerical solution techniques
There exist large classes of PDEs for which analytic solution techniques are not known [23].
Furthermore, examples of solutions to PDEs may guide the intuition of a mathematician in the
analysis of a given model. For these reasons, standard methods from numerical analysis are
often utilised to approximate solutions to initial-boundary value problems involving PDEs. The
most commonly used techniques may be categorised into three classes, namely finite difference
methods, finite element methods, and spectral methods [85].
The selection of a suitable numerical solution technique for a particular PDE may depend on
various criteria. The ease of implementation and computational efficiency of a numerical method,
as well as the accuracy of the method, are to be considered. Furthermore, the characteristics of
the PDE under consideration may disqualify the use of certain numerical solution techniques.
Spectral methods are generally the most computationally efficient and the most accurate meth-
ods, but are constrained to specific problem classes [85]. The best known spectral technique, the
Fourier transform, may for example only be applied to solve problems with periodic boundary
conditions [25]. When applying these techniques, the solution is expressed as the sum of cer-
tain basis functions (such as sinusoids in the case of Fourier series). Other spectral techniques
typically used in respect of specific problem classes involve the use of Chebyshev polynomials
for bounded one-dimensional problems [98], Bessel functions for two-dimensional radial prob-
lems [148], or Legendre polynomials for three-dimensional problems involving Laplace’s equa-
tion2 [67], to name but a few.
Finite element methods are typically the most taxing from a computational point of view, but
may be applied to an extensive class of problems with complicated boundary conditions [140].
These techniques may, for example, be used when the problem domain has an irregular geometry.
In these techniques, the domain is discretised into a set of nonoverlapping polyhedrons (such as
triangles) [139]. Interpolation functions are then determined on this discretised domain with a
view to minimise some error function, as an approximate solution [30].
The focus in this thesis is, however, on finite difference methods, since these techniques are best
suited to solving the models considered, for reasons which will become apparent later. These
techniques are computationally more efficient than finite element methods and various types of
boundary conditions are tractable under these routines [85].
Finite difference methods approximate derivative values over a discretised domain using dif-
ference equations. The required equations may be derived from Taylor expansions (see Theo-
rem 3.4). For example, an expression approximating the value of the first derivative of a function
may be derived from the Taylor expansions [133]
h(λ+ δ) = h(λ) + δh′(λ) +
δ2
2!
h′′(λ) +
δ3
3!
h′′′(λ+ α1δ) (3.19)
and
h(λ− δ) = h(λ)− δh′(λ) + δ
2
2!
h′′(λ)− δ
3
3!
h′′′(λ+ α2δ), (3.20)
where α1, α2 ∈ [0, 1]. Subtracting (3.20) from (3.19) yields
h(λ+ δ)− h(λ− δ) = 2δh′(λ) + δ
3
3!
(h′′′(λ+ α1δ) + h′′′(λ+ α2δ)) (3.21)
2Laplace’s equation, defined as ∇w = 0, arises in many applications in science, including electromagnetism,
astronomy and fluid dynamics [151].
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and it follows from the mean value theorem (see Theorem 3.1) that
h′′′(λa) =
h′′′(λ+ α1δ) + h′′′(λ+ α2δ)
2
for some λa ∈ [λ, λ + δ]. By substituting this expression into (3.21) and dividing by 2δ, the
expression
h′(λ) =
h(λ+ δ)− h(λ− δ)
2δ
+
δ2
6
h′′′(λa) (3.22)
for the first derivative of h at λ is obtained. The first derivative of h at λ may therefore be
approximated by
h′(λ) ≈ h(λ+ δ)− h(λ− δ)
2δ
(3.23)
with a truncation error of order δ2. By utilising (3.23) on a discretised domain, the value of the
first derivative of a function at a given point is therefore approximated using the neighbouring
function values. The accuracy of the approximation may be improved either by utilising more
terms in the Taylor expansions during the derivation of an approximation scheme, thus increasing
the order of the truncation error, or by decreasing the discretisation step size δ. Examples of
such centre-difference schemes are provided in Table 3.1. For approximations at the boundaries,
similar expressions may be derived to ultimately utilise only forward or backward differences,
as shown in Table 3.2.
Centre difference schemes Truncation error
h′(λ) ≈ h(λ+ δ)− h(λ− δ)/2δ O(δ2)
h′′(λ) ≈ h(λ+ δ)− 2h(λ) + h(λ− δ)/δ2 O(δ2)
h′(λ) ≈ − h(λ+ 2δ) + 8h(λ+ δ)− 8h(λ− δ) + h(λ− 2δ)/12δ O(δ4)
h′′(λ) ≈ − h(λ+ 2δ) + 16h(λ+ δ)− 30h(λ) + 16h(λ− δ)− h(λ− 2δ)/12δ2 O(δ4)
Table 3.1: Centre-difference schemes for the approximation of first and second derivatives and the order
of their truncation errors.
O(δ2) forward- and backward-difference schemes
h′(λ) ≈ − 3h(λ) + 4h(λ+ δ)− h(λ+ 2δ)/2δ
h′(λ) ≈ 3h(λ)− 4h(λ− δ) + h(λ− 2δ)/2δ
h′′(λ) ≈ 2h(λ)− 5h(λ+ δ) + 4h(λ+ 2δ)− h(λ+ 3δ)/δ3
h′′(λ) ≈ 2h(λ)− 5h(λ− δ) + 4h(λ− 2δ)− h(λ− 3δ)/δ3
Table 3.2: Forward- and backward-difference schemes for the approximation of first and second deriva-
tives with an O(δ2) truncation error.
The aforementioned schemes are usually implemented using sparse matrices [85]. The points
in the discretised domain are stacked in a vector (if the original domain has more than one
dimension, since in the one-dimensional case, the discretised domain is a vector). A sparse
matrix which performs derivative approximations on these points upon multiplication may then
be constructed. Suppose, as an example, that the second order derivative of a real-valued
function w defined on the domain [λa, λb] ⊂ R is to be approximated, and that periodic Dirichlet
boundary conditions are imposed. Multiplying by (1/δ2)D2 · w approximates the operation
d2/dλ2 on the discretised domain x = [λa, λa + δ, λa + 2δ, . . . , λb − δ], where w is a discretised
approximation of w(λ, t) at each point in x at time t for δ = λb−λaN , where N is the number of
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discretisation points, and
D2 =

−2 1 0 0 . . . 1
1 −2 1 0 . . . 0
0 1
. . .
. . . 0
0 0
. . . 0
...
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 −2 1
1 0 0 . . . 1 −2

(3.24)
is an N × N matrix. The point λb is excluded from x since w(λa, t) = w(λb, t) because of the
periodicity of w on [λa, λb]. Slight alterations are made when implementing different boundary
conditions. By including λb at the end of x (and therefore also increasing the dimension of w
by 1), changing D2 to a (N + 1)× (N + 1) square matrix and changing the elements in row 1,
column 2 and row N + 1, column N to 2, for example, zero-flux Neuman boundary conditions
are imposed.
Parabolic or hyperbolic PDEs describing physical systems tend to have a first derivative with
respect to time [133]. By utilising finite difference approximations of all spatial derivatives,
standard time-stepping techniques for ODEs may therefore be utilised to solve initial-boundary
value problems involving these types of PDEs. The simplest time-stepping technique is known
as Euler’s method [85]. In this technique, the definition of a derivative dw/dt = lim4t→0(w(t+
4t)− w(t))/4t, is utilised to approximate solutions to ODEs. Consider the ODE
dw
dt
= h(w, t) (3.25)
in which case
w(t+4t)− w(t)
4t ≈ h(w, t). (3.26)
By rearranging the terms of (3.26), it follows that
w(t+4t) ≈ w(t) +4th(w, t). (3.27)
Given an initial condition w(0) = w0, a solution to (3.25) for t > 0 may therefore be approx-
imated using (3.27). As with finite difference approximation, time-stepping schemes may be
derived from Taylor expansions. The number of terms utilised in these Taylor expansions once
again determine the order of the truncation error made when using the scheme. In general,
methods used to iterate solutions to differential equations forward in time utilising a single
initial point are referred to as Runga-Kutta methods [85]. Such methods, which express the
solution at the next time step as a function of the current solution, are called explicit schemes,
in contrast to implicit iteration schemes which utilise the future solution on both sides of the
difference equation.
A balance between ease of implementation, accuracy and computational efficiency is usually
sought in numerical schemes. When considering accuracy, the round-off error made during each
time step must be considered in conjunction with the truncation error. A smaller step size
decreases the truncation error, but increases the cumulative effect of round-off errors. For a
given numerical scheme and a fixed local round-off error size, the global accuracy therefore
cannot be increased above a certain threshold. Further increases in accuracy are available
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by deriving schemes with higher order truncation errors by utilising more terms of the Taylor
expansion. Perhaps the most popular explicit time-stepping scheme is the 4th-order Runga-Kutta
method [30],
wn+1 = wn +
4t
6
(h1 + 2h2 + 2h3 + h4), (3.28)
where
h1 = h(tn, wn),
h2 = h
(
tn +
4t
2
, wn +
4t
2
h1
)
,
h3 = h
(
tn +
4t
2
, wn +
4t
2
h2
)
and
h4 = h(tn +4t, wn +4th3).
This scheme has a local truncation error of O4t5 and therefore a global truncation error of
O4t4. If the local truncation error of a difference equation approximating a solution to a PDE
initial and boundary value problem tends to zero as the time and space discretisation intervals
tend to zero, then the difference equation is said to be consistent [10]. The notion of consistency
is formally defined as follows.
Definition 3.12 (Consistency [133, p. 40–41])
Suppose w is the exact solution to a PDE together with appropriate boundary and initial con-
ditions, involving two independent variables (e.g. space and time), defined by L(w) = 0, and
that W is the exact solution to a difference equation defined by P (W ) = 0. The local truncation
error at a point (i, j) is then given by Ti,j(w) = Pi,j(w). If Ti,j(w)→ 0 as 4t→ 0 and 4λ→ 0,
where 4t and 4λ represent the time and space discretisation step sizes, respectively, then P is
consistent with L.
A numerical scheme is considered stable [133] if (truncation and round-off) errors decay in
proportion to the exact solution of the PDE, as the scheme progresses forward in time. Im-
plicit schemes, which are typically more cumbersome to implement than explicit schemes, are
usually selected for their excellent stability properties [85]. According to the Lax equivalence
theorem [31], the discretised approximation to a well posed initial-value problem converges to
the exact solution of the initial-value problem if it is consistent and stable. The notion of
convergence of a difference equation is defined as follows.
Definition 3.13 (Convergence [133, p. 43–44])
Suppose w is the exact solution to a PDE together with appropriate boundary and initial condi-
tions, involving two independent variables (e.g. space and time) and defined by L(w) = 0, and
that W is the exact solution of a difference equation defined by P (W ) = 0. If at a time t = ta
the solution W → w as 4t → 0 and 4λ → 0, where 4t and 4λ represent the time and space
discretisation step sizes, respectively, then P is convergent with respect to L.
During numerical analyses of equations of the form (3.12) it has been found that explicit schemes
are efficient solution methods [142]. It has been shown that a difference scheme for approximat-
ing solutions to equations of the form (3.12) based on (3.27) and the O(δ2) centre difference
approximation of the second order spatial derivatives is convergent for an abitrary number of
spatial dimensions and for any number of solution components, if the exact solution of the PDE
initial-boundary value problem has a continuous second order derivative with respect to time,
as well as a continuous fourth order derivative with respect to space, for each component [89].
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In the simplest case of a single component in one spatial dimension, the scheme is defined as
wn+1 = Awn +4tg(wn), (3.29)
where A is a difference operator, w is a vector approximation of the component densities along
the domain at a given point in time and 4t is the time discretisation step size. In this one-
dimensional case, the difference operator is defined as
A = I + νD2 =

1− 2ν ν 0 0 . . . 0
ν 1− 2ν ν 0 . . . 0
0 ν
. . .
. . . 0
0 0
. . . 0
...
...
...
0 0 . . . ν 1− 2ν ν
0 0 0 . . . ν 1− 2ν

,
where I is the identity matrix, ν = (d4t)/4λ2, d is the diffusion rate and 4λ is the spatial
discretisation interval size. It has also been shown that this scheme is stable if ν ≤ 1/2 [89].
3.6 Chapter summary
A variety of basic mathematical definitions and theorems used in the arguments put forward
later in this thesis were reviewed in the first section of this chapter. A brief introduction to
the field of differential equations was then given, after which a standard classification of second-
order linear PDEs was reviewed. The focus of the discussion next shifted to reaction-diffusion
systems. A method for analysing the stability of equilibrium solutions to certain PDEs was
then reviewed. Certain numerical solution techniques for the approximation of solutions to
initial-boundary value problems involving PDEs were then described briefly, after which finite
difference methods were reviewed.
The mathematical literature review in this chapter is by no means exhaustive or in any sense
representative. Instead, the contents of this chapter should be understood to form a prerequisite
basis of understanding for the remainder of the thesis, which will contain frequent references
back to this chapter.
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Two simple, highly idealised models of the dynamics of wealth distribution with contrasting
redistribution schemes are derived in this chapter. The first is a reaction-diffusion model rep-
resenting a trickle-down type of wealth redistribution, while the second model represents the
imposition of a linear tax rate over wealth. First, the assumptions made in order to derive
the mathematical models are noted, after which the mathematical derivation follows. Metrics
that may be used to characterise the growth of wealth and the extent of inequality in model
solutions are defined next, and their equivalence to traditional measures of wealth distribution
is demonstrated. The wealth growth functions to be considered are then introduced. The ex-
istence and uniqueness of model solutions, as well as the nonnegativity of these solutions and
their first derivatives over space, are established next. The models’ limitations and intended use
are finally discussed in a formal model apology.
4.1 Model assumptions
The following assumptions are made in order to derive two models of the temporal evolution of
wealth distribution in a socio-economic system:
1. The notion of space. It is assumed that the distribution of wealth in an economy can be
represented over some hypothetical space representing equally distributed entities (which
may be companies within a certain sector, persons or households, for example). A certain
portion of this space therefore refers to that same portion of the total entities.
41
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2. Continuity and smoothness of wealth distribution over space and time. It is assumed that
a sufficiently large number of entities may be ordered in such a manner that their wealth
can be approximated by a twice differentiable continuous function over space and time.
Closeness of entities in space therefore implies similar wealth positions.
3. Conservation of wealth. It is assumed that wealth is conserved in redistributive processes,
so that the change in total wealth depends explicitly on growth processes only. Since the
wealth distributional shape may influence the growth rates attained, redistribution does
implicitly influence the change in wealth over time, but wealth is not created or lost during
transfers.
4. Homogeneity in the growth and redistribution of wealth. As the work in this thesis is an
exploration of the simplest possible environments facilitating the emergence of inequality,
it is assumed that wealth growth characteristics depend only on the current wealth distri-
bution. The possibility of total wealth equality is allowed in the exploration of inequality,
and it follows that growth and redistribution processes affecting an entity do not explicitly
depend on the entity’s position in space.
5. Initial wealth distribution. Since entities may be ordered according to their wealth, it is
assumed without loss of generality that their initial wealth distribution is non-decreasing
over space. It is also assumed that this initial distribution is non-negative, and so entities
may posses zero, but not negative, wealth.
6. Redistribution of wealth. It is assumed that, through regulation, some wealth may be
transferred from the wealthy to the less wealthy. Two scenarios are considered:
(a) It is assumed that the rate of wealth redistribution is directly proportional to the
wealth distribution gradient, with a constant of proportionality d ≥ 0. Since wealth
is represented by a continuous, twice differentiable function over space, this translates
to a subtraction from the wealth of entities at and near local wealth maxima and an
addition to the wealth of entities at or near local wealth minima, separated by points
of inflection. As mentioned in §2.3, this approach has previously been adopted in
modelling wealth redistribution. This is mathematically equivalent to the process of
diffusion, and the net redistribution effect therefore corresponds to wealth only flowing
directly between entities in close proximity (i.e. having similar wealth positions). It
should be noted that actual transfers need not occur in this fashion, but that the
positions of progressive tax brackets and of grant recipients may be determined using
the second derivative of an estimate of the current wealth distribution over space,
resulting in a diffusion-like net redistributive effect. The model is in this case referred
to as the trickle-down model.
(b) It is assumed that the rate of redistribution experienced by an entity is directly pro-
portional to the entity’s wealth position relative to the population’s average wealth
position, also with a constant of proportionality d ≥ 0. This corresponds to a non-
localised wealth redistribution scheme where the greatest net contribution, and net
benefit, occur at the most wealthy and least wealthy entity, respectively. This cor-
responds to a linear tax over wealth, with negative taxes at wealth levels below the
mean wealth, so that redistribution is conservative as required by Assumption 3. The
model in this case is referred to as the linear redistribution model
7. Boundary conditions. In the space used to represent entities in the system, wealth flux
across the boundaries would represent unaccounted for changes in total wealth, as a re-
sult of changes in the wealth positions of only the most and least wealthy entities in
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the population. This would translate into a non-wealth-conserving redistribution scheme.
Zero-flux Neuman boundary conditions are therefore imposed for case (a) above, meaning
that wealth cannot exit or enter the system across its boundaries. In case (b), however,
the redistribution term implicitly conserves wealth, so that no further restrictions on the
boundaries are required.
8. The growth of wealth. It is assumed that, viewed from a macro perspective, the growth
experienced at a given wealth level is proportional to that wealth level. This does not neces-
sarily imply that individual entities with the same wealth level experience the same growth
(entities’ positions in space are not necessarily fixed), but that distributional changes over
time can be captured by describing the average per capita wealth growth rate in the
wealth distribution at a given wealth attainment level. The growth function therefore
assumes Kolmogorov form [42]. It is assumed that the distributional dependence of the
per capita growth rate may be captured by adopting a measure of the distributional shape
(the normalised variance is chosen in this case), and of the total wealth.
4.2 Model derivation
Two mathematical models of wealth dynamics are derived in this section, based on the assump-
tions outlined above. First, a model with a trickle-down type redistribution, inspired by the
notion of diffusion, is derived. An alternative model, employing a conservative linear redistribu-
tive tax scheme, is then derived.
4.2.1 Trickle-down model
By assumptions 1 and 2 of §4.1, the wealth level at a position λ in a finite, one-dimensional real
spatial domain D and at a time t ∈ [0,∞) may be denoted by a twice differentiable continuous
function w(λ, t). If V ⊂ D is an arbitrary subset of D, with boundaries λa and λb, where λa < λb,
and the net change in wealth as a result of redistribution is equivalent to transfers performed
only between adjacent entities according to the first case of Assumption 6(a), then
d
dt
∫
V
w(λ, t) dv = J(λa, t)− J(λb, t) +
∫
V
g(w, µ, V ) dv,
according to Assumption 3, where J(λ, t) is the flux of wealth at position λ and time t, and g is
the net growth in V, with µ and V representing the total wealth and the normalised variance of
w over D, respectively. According to Assumption 6, J(λ, t) = −d∂w/∂λ, where d is a constant
of proportionality denoting the diffusion rate, or the rate of redistribution of wealth. Therefore,
d
dt
∫
V
w(λ, t) dv = −d
[
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λa
− ∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λb
]
+
∫
V
g(w, µ, V ) dv
and so by the fundamental theorem of the calculus (see Theorem 3.2),
d
dt
∫
V
w(λ, t) dv = d
∫
V
∂2w
∂λ2
dv +
∫
V
g(w, µ, V ) dv,
or, in rearranged form, ∫
V
[
∂w
∂t
− g(w, µ, V )− d∂
2w
∂λ2
]
dv = 0.
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Since V is an arbitrary subset of D, however, it follows that
∂w
∂t
= g(w, µ, V ) + d
∂2w
∂λ2
.
Furthermore, since the growth rate is expressed as a function of the local wealth attainment
level w, the total wealth µ and the normalised variance V , the reaction term g(w, µ, V ) may be
written in Kolmogorov form wf(w, µ, V ) according to Assumption 8. Assume, without loss of
generality, that D is the unit interval [0, 1] of real numbers. Then the boundary value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= wf(w, µ, V ) + d
∂2w
∂λ2
λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0, (4.1)
B.C.
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0, t ≥ 0, (4.2)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D, (4.3)
is obtained as a model of wealth distribution over time, according to Assumptions 5 and 7, where
f is the per capita growth rate of wealth and w0 is the initial wealth distribution. The model
(4.1)–(4.3) is henceforth called the trickle-down model of wealth distribution.
4.2.2 Linear redistribution model
In the second case of Assumption 6 of §4.1, it follows from Assumptions 1 and 2 that the wealth
level at a position λ in a finite, one-dimensional spatial domain D ≡ [0, 1] and at a time t ∈ [0,∞)
may once again be denoted by a twice differentiable continuous function w(λ, t). If V ⊂ D is
again an arbitrary subset of D, and wealth is transferred between entities depending on their
position relative to the population’s mean wealth according to Assumption 6(b), then
d
dt
∫
V
w(λ, t) dv = d
∫
V
[µ(t)− w(λ, t)] dv +
∫
V
g(w, µ, V ) dv,
according to Assumption 3, where µ(t) =
∫
D w(λ, t) dλ, which may be rearranged to obtain∫
V
[
∂w
∂t
− g(w, µ, V )− d[µ(t)− w(λ, t)]
]
dv = 0.
Since V is an arbitrary subset of D, it follows that
∂w
∂t
= g(w, µ, V ) + d[µ(t)− w(λ, t)].
Furthermore, since the effects of growth are expressed as a growth rate in terms of a given wealth
attainment, the reaction term g(w, µ, V ) may again be written in Kolmogorov form wf(w, µ, V )
according to Assumption 8, in which case the initial value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= wf(w, µ, V ) + d[µ(t)− w(λ, t)] λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0, (4.4)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D (4.5)
is obtained as a model of wealth distribution over time, according to Assumptions 5 and 7, where
f is the per capita growth rate of wealth and w0 is the initial wealth distribution. The model
(4.4)–(4.5) is henceforth called the linear redistribution model of wealth distribution.
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4.3 Measures of the distribution of wealth
At an arbitrary time t ≥ 0, the total wealth is given by
µ(t) =
∫
D
w(λ, t) dλ. (4.6)
This wealth (which is also the mean wealth because of the choice of D) is analogous to
µ(t) =
∫ ∞
0
w(λ, t)θ(w, t) dw
by the following proposition, where θ is the density function of w at time t.
Proposition 4.1 (Equivalence of parade and frequency distribution modelling approaches)
Let w(λ, t) be a solution to (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5) on D× [0, Tmax] and suppose θ(w, t) is the
density function of w at time t ∈ [0, Tmax] for some Tmax > 0. Then∫
D
wn(λ, t) dλ =
∫ ∞
0
wnθ(w, t) dw (4.7)
for all t ∈ [0, Tmax] and any n ∈ N.
Proof. Viewing the integral on the left-hand side of (4.7) as a Riemann sum1 it follows that
∫
D
wn(λ, t) dλ = lim
m→∞
1
m
m∑
i=1
wn(λi, t), (4.8)
where λi = i/m for i = 0, 1, . . . ,m, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Denote the minimum and maximum value in the set {wn(λi, t)}mi=1 by wnmin(t) and wnmax(t),
respectively, and partition the interval [wnmin(t), w
n
max(t)] into p wealth brackets of equal length.
Let wnj (t) be the centre point of the j-th wealth bracket and denote the number of w
n(λi, t)
terms on the right-hand side of (4.8) within the j-th bracket by γj(t). Then
∫
D
wn(λ, t) dλ = lim
m→∞ limp→∞
wmax(t)− wmin(t)
mp
p∑
j=1
γj(t)w
n
j (t)
= lim
m→∞ limp→∞
wmax(t)− wmin(t)
p
p∑
j=1
θj(t)w
n
j (t)
=
∫ ∞
0
wnθ(w) dw,
where θj(t) = γj(t)/m denotes the proportion of w
n(λi, t) terms on the right-hand side of (4.8)
that reside within the j-th wealth bracket at time t, and θ(w, t) is the density function of w at
time t.
1The sum
∑n
i=1 h(λ
∗
i )4λi of values of a real-valued function h defined on a real, closed interval [λa, λb]
partitioned by points λa < λ1 < λ2 < · · · < λn−1 < λb into n intervals of lengths 4λ1,4λ2, . . . ,4λn, where λ∗k
is any point in subinterval k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is called a Riemann sum [136].
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. . . . . .
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1 (t)
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wn2 (t)
wnp (t)
wn(λm, t)
Figure 4.1: Viewing an integral as a Riemann sum.
Consider the variance
V (t) =
∫
D
[w(λ, t)− µ(t)]2 dλ (4.9)
=
∫
D
w2(λ, t) dλ− 2µ(t)
∫
D
w(λ, t) dλ+ µ2(t) (4.10)
of the wealth function w(λ, t) over D at a fixed value of t. By substituting (4.6) into (4.10), it
follows that
V (t) =
∫
D
w2(λ, t) dλ− µ2(t), (4.11)
and by substituting (4.7) into (4.11), the variance may be rewritten as
V (t) =
∫ ∞
0
w2θ(w) dw − µ2(t)
=
∫ ∞
0
[w − µ(t)]2θ(w) dw,
which is a measure of the absolute inequality of the wealth function w(λ, t) at time t. Absolute
inequality of wealth measures the numerical difference between entities’ wealth positions. A
proportional increase in wealth across the entire domain (multiplication by some positive con-
stant) therefore causes an increase in absolute inequality of wealth, but this absolute inequality
is unaffected by a uniform addition of wealth across the domain.
In contrast, the normalised variance
V (t) =
∫
D
[
w(λ, t)− µ(t)
µ(t)
]2
dλ (4.12)
is a measure of the relative inequality of the wealth function w(λ, t) at time t. Here the term
relative inequality refers to changes in the normalised wealth distribution, and is therefore un-
affected by proportional changes in wealth across the entire domain. A uniform addition to the
wealth position of all entities will, however, result in a decrease in relative inequality.
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It can be shown that (4.12) is a special case of the class of generalised entropy measures of
inequality defined in (2.1). This may be confirmed by the expansion
V (t) =
∫
D
[
w2(λ, t)− 2w(λ, t)µ(t) + µ2(t)
µ2(t)
]
dλ
=
∫
D
[
w(λ, t)
µ(t)
]2
dλ− 2
µ(t)
∫
D
w(λ, t) dλ+ 1
=
∫
D
[
w(λ, t)
µ(t)
]2
dλ− 1, (4.13)
of the expression (4.12). Note that (4.13) is simply the continuous case of (2.1) multiplied by
2, with s = 2.
It should be noted that relative inequality of wealth is of far greater significance in the current
investigation than absolute inequality of wealth. If general statements are to be made about the
shape of a wealth distribution, these have to be phrased in terms of relative inequality, since a
wealth distribution of some shape may correspond to an arbitrary absolute inequality of wealth.
While certainly applicable in terms of relative inequality of wealth, the argument that increasing
inequality is unsustainable does not necessarily apply to absolute inequality of wealth. For
increasing relative inequality of wealth, the relative distribution becomes more unequal over
time, meaning that some subset of the population owns an ever-decreasing proportion of the
total wealth. It is self-evident that this phenomenon is unsustainable. In a system where net
growth is positive and proportional to the current distribution with some constant growth rate,
however, the relative wealth distribution remains unchanged, while absolute inequality of wealth
is increasing, and it is not evident that this represents an unsustainable situation.
4.4 Per capita wealth growth-rate functions
The different per capita wealth growth-rate functions to be considered in this thesis are now
put forward and their underlying assumptions are considered. As the models derived in §4.2
are aimed at facilitating an exploration of the simplest possible descriptions of certain macroe-
conomic phenomena related to the distribution of wealth, the wealth growth functions to be
considered are introduced here and also considered in later chapters in order of increasing com-
plexity. Each new growth function contributes more interesting, and perhaps more realistic,
characteristics and behaviour.
As mentioned in §1.1, assuming per capita wealth growth-rate functions that are increasing over
wealth is sufficient to produce increasing relative inequality over time. The simplest possible
per capita wealth growth-rate function that is increasing over wealth is the linear function
f(w) = a+ bw, (4.14)
where a and b are constants. If b = 0, this represents a case where the entire population
experiences the same proportional growth. Absolute inequality increases under this growth
function (assuming a > 0), since the absolute difference between entities’ wealth positions are
magnified over time, as illustrated for an initial Gaussian distribution of wealth in Figure 4.2(a).
The wealth distribution shape, and its relative inequality, is not influenced by this type of
growth, as illustrated in Figure 4.2(b). Any amount of redistribution is therefore expected to
result in decreased relative inequality.
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Figure 4.2: A constant per capita wealth growth rate magnifies the absolute wealth distribution (a),
but does not produce a change in the relative wealth distribution (b). The figures are based on numerical
approximations of the solution to (4.1)–(4.3) obtained by applying the method (3.29) with step sizes
4t = 0.05 and 4λ = 1/80, and assuming the initial condition w0(λ) = exp(−10(λ− 1)2) and parameter
values a = 0.1 and b = d = 0.
If b > 0, however, the per capita wealth growth-rate function ensures that growth rates at higher
wealth levels are greater than at lower wealth levels and therefore an increase in relative inequal-
ity is possible, as illustrated for the same Gaussian initial distribution of wealth in Figure 4.3.
The extent of redistribution required to limit the growth of relative inequality now becomes
a question of interest. The case where b < 0 is not of interest in an economic context. Such
models (with a > 0 and b < 0) take the form of Fisher’s equation [57] (see equation (3.13)) and
have been studied extensively in the literature on biological species modelling. In all subsequent
discussions, it is assumed that b ≥ 0.
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(a) Absolute wealth distribution over time
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(b) Relative wealth distribution over time
Figure 4.3: A linearly increasing per capita wealth growth rate changes the relative wealth distribution’s
shape, corresponding to increased inequality. The figures are based on numerical approximations of the
solution to (3.14)–(3.16) obtained by applying the method (3.29) with step size 4t = and 4λ = 1/80,
and assuming the initial condition w0(λ) = exp(−10(λ− 1)2) and parameter values a = 0.1, b = 0.01 and
d = 0.
If a is negative, the situation is encountered where negative wealth growth rates are experienced
by entities possessing less than a certain critical wealth level. This may represent a situation
where there exists a certain minimum capital requirement, below which an entity’s fixed expenses
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are greater than its possible returns, resulting in a steadily decreasing wealth position below this
critical wealth level. A question of interest in this situation is, therefore, for a population with a
wealth distribution around this critical wealth level, how redistribution impacts the population’s
capability to rise above this critical wealth level.
An unfortunate property of (4.14), however, is that as entities’ wealth levels increase, the rate
of growth is allowed to increase indefinitely. Only the initial evolution of inequality subject to
this wealth growth-rate function is therefore of interest, as well as changes in the total wealth
when distributed around a critical wealth level, whereas continual growth above such a critical
level is not of practical interest.
It may be argued that an increase in the total population wealth should result in a corresponding
decrease in the growth rate attained at a given fixed wealth level. The emergence of large
corporations, which draw greater benefit from economies of scale, detract from the performance
of smaller competing companies, for example. A simple addition to (4.14) incorporates this
phenomenon,
f(w, µ) = a+ bw − cµ, (4.15)
where c is a nonnegative constant and where µ is defined as in (4.6). The per capita wealth
growth-rate function (4.15) is therefore capable of capturing, in a very simple fashion, both the
instability of an unregulated free market, in the sense that it can allow increasing inequality
in the distribution of wealth, and the inherent competition in such a system, where relative
value or size is of far greater significance than absolute attainment levels. For both (4.14) and
(4.15), a higher level of inequality results in a larger rate of growth of total wealth, for any given
mean wealth. While it was noted in §2.2 that increased inequality can lead to increased economic
growth, it was also noted that several sources argue that severe inequality of wealth may hamper
economic growth. It may therefore be reasonable to assume that inequality contributes to
economic growth provided that the level of inequality is less than some threshold, above which
increased inequality reduces economic growth. Since the aforementioned wealth growth-rate
functions already incorporate the positive relation between increased inequality and growth, only
a term which introduces the negative effect of inequality on total growth need be added in order
to capture the effect of severe wealth inequality hampering economic growth. A quantitative
measure of the relative inequality of a distribution’s shape is therefore required.
As was noted in §4.3, the normalised variance corresponds to a generalised entropy inequality
index (which quantifies relative inequality) with sensitivity parameter s = 2. This choice of
s weighs wealth deviations farther from the mean more heavily, and results in a metric that
is convenient in view of its simplicity. Inherent to this choice is the assumption that a large
deviation from the mean wealth in a small population subset is more detrimental to economic
growth than a small deviation from the mean in a large population subset, which is reasonable.
No claim is made, however, that this choice of sensitivity parameter and corresponding measure
of inequality is necessarily superior to other possibilities. The aim is simply to investigate and
showcase the variety of possible model solution behaviours that result from the inclusion of a
wealth growth function which depends on the extent of wealth inequality. The resulting per
capita wealth growth-rate function is
f(w, µ, V ) = a+ bw − cµ− kV , (4.16)
where k is a nonnegative constant and where V is defined as in (4.12).
The per capita growth-rate functions considered in this thesis are therefore all special cases of
(4.16). Figure 4.4 depicts f for positive wealth with b, c, k > 0 and a < cµ+ kV .
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f(w, µ, V )
b
1
a− cµ− kV
wcµ+kV−a
b
Figure 4.4: Linearly increasing per capita wealth growth-rate as a function of wealth, translating
proportional to the mean wealth and to normalised variance.
4.5 Existence and properties of model solutions
In this section, the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the models derived in §4.2 are
established. Nonnegativity of solutions over space is also established in each case.
The system (4.1)–(4.3) is a single-component instance of (3.14)–(3.16), where τ ≡ 0. The
following corollary therefore follows from Proposition 3.8.
Corollary 4.1 (Existence and uniqueness of trickle-down model solutions)
If w0 is twice differentiable on D, and g = wf(w, µ, V ) is Lipschitz continuous on D × [0, Tmax]
for some Tmax > 0, then (4.1)–(4.3) has a unique, classical solution on D × [0, Tmax].
The initial value problem (4.4)–(4.5), is a limiting case as n→∞ of the initial value problem
dw
dt
= wf(w) + d
[
1
n
n∑
i=1
wi −w
]
, (4.17)
w(0) = κi, i ∈ 1, 2, . . . n (4.18)
for a system of ODEs, where w is an n-column vector, wi denotes the i-th entry of w and
κi = wi(0) = w(i/n, 0). The change in height over time of each rectangle in the Riemann sum in
(4.17) is determined by an ODE. As n→∞, the width of each ODE’s representative strip tends
to zero and the solution to the system (4.17)–(4.18) tends to that of (4.4)–(4.5). According to
Proposition 3.6, (4.17)–(4.18) has a unique solution on [0, Tmax) for some Tmax > 0 if the right-
hand side of (4.17) and its first order derivative over wealth are continuous on [0, Tmax). This
may be extended to the initial value problem (4.4)–(4.5) according to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.2 (Existence and uniqueness of linear redistribution model solutions)
The initial value problem (4.4)–(4.5) has a unique solution on D × [0, Tmax) for some Tmax >
0 if the Riemann sum 1n
∑n
i=1wi in (4.17) converges to
∫
D w dλ. The existence of bounded
solutions to (4.17)–(4.18) on [0, Tmax), according to Proposition 3.7, guarantees the convergence
of 1n
∑n
i=1wi on D × [0, Tmax) and therefore the existence and uniqueness of solutions to (4.4)–
(4.5) on D × [0, Tmax).
The differential equations (4.1) and (4.4) are both of the form
∂w
∂t
= g(w, µ, V ) + dR(w, µ), (4.19)
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where R(w, µ) represents the redistributive influence. The following property of R will be useful
in the chapters that follow.
Lemma 4.1 (Nonnegativity of the redistributive term)
Let w be the unique solution to the initial-boundary value problem (4.1)–(4.3), or to the initial
value problem (4.4)–(4.5). Suppose w(λ, t) ≥ 0 for all λ ∈ D at time t. If w(λ∗, t) = 0, then
R|w=w(λ∗,t) ≥ 0.
Proof. In the case of (4.1) it follows from the continuity and twice differentiability of w that
∂2w/∂λ2
∣∣
λ=λ∗ ≥ 0 by Theorem 3.3, since w(λ∗, t) is a minimum of w on D at time t. Since
g(w, µ, V ) = 0 when w = 0, it follows from (4.19) that ∂w/∂t|λ=λ∗ ≥ 0. Furthermore, since the
minimum value of a function is not greater than its mean, the desired result follows immediately
in the case of (4.4).
The following result now follows from the lemma above.
Proposition 4.2 (Nonnegativily of model solutions)
Let w(λ, t) be the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5) on D×[0, Tmax] for some Tmax > 0.
Then w(λ, t) ≥ 0 on D × [0, Tmax].
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose the last time at which w is entirely nonnegative on D, before
becoming negative for the first time at some point(s) in D, occurs at t = t∗ ≥ 0. The continuity of
w then implies that w(λ∗, t∗) = 0 and ∂w/∂t|λ=λ∗,t=t∗ < 0 for some λ∗ ∈ D. The nonnegativity
of the redistribution term R(w) at (λ∗, t∗), according to Lemma 4.1, together with the fact that
g|w=w(λ∗,t∗) = 0 since g(w, µ, V ) = wf(w, µ, V ), however, imply that ∂w/∂t|λ=λ∗,t=t∗ ≥ 0, a
contradiction.
It is finally shown that the derivative of wealth over space also remains nonnegative for all time,
and therefore that the maximum wealth in (4.19) always occurs at λ = 1 and that the minimum
wealth occurs at λ = 0.
Proposition 4.3 (Preservation of wealth ordering over space)
Let w(λ, t) be the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5) on D×[0, Tmax] for some Tmax > 0.
Then ∂w∂λ ≥ 0 on D × [0, Tmax].
Proof. Suppose ∂w/∂λ ≥ 0 at an arbitrary time ta ≥ 0. Then, for arbitrary values λa, λb ∈ D
satisfying λa < λb, it follows that w(λa, ta) ≤ w(λb, ta). The difference between the rate of
change in w at λb and λa at time t is given by
ρ(w, λa, λb, t) =
∂w
∂t
∣∣∣∣
λ=λb
− ∂w
∂t
∣∣∣∣
λ=λa
= wf(w, µ, V )|λ=λb − wf(w, µ, V )|λ=λa︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
+ d [R(w, µ)|λ=λb −R(w, µ)|λ=λa ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗∗)
.
If w(λa, ta) = w(λb, ta), then it follows that ∂w/∂λ = 0 everywhere on [λa, λb] and the term (∗)
equals zero. Since [µ(ta)−w(λb, ta)]−[µ(ta)−w(λa, ta)] = 0 if w(λa, ta) = w(λb, ta) it follows that
the term (∗∗) is zero in the case of (4.4). In the case of (4.1), furthermore, ∂2w/∂λ2|λ=λa,t=ta ≤ 0
and ∂2w/∂λ2|λ=λb,t=ta ≥ 0 if w(λa, ta) = w(λb, ta), from which it follows that ρ(w, λa, λb, ta) ≥ 0.
The nonnegativity of the spatial derivative as a function of λ therefore cannot be reversed.
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4.6 Model apology
The models derived in §4.2 are highly idealised abstractions of the growth and redistribution of
wealth in real socio-economic environments for a number of reasons. The use of a continuous
function to represent the characteristics of some discrete set of entities is a case in point. Certain
requirements in continuous space do not necessarily have interpretations in a discrete paradigm.
For example, the requirement of zero-flux Neumann boundary conditions does not have an
immediate interpretation in a discrete sense, since the proportion of the wealth function for
which the spatial derivative is zero may be arbitrarily small. This requirement does not therefore
correspond to an expectation in terms of the shape of wealth distributions observed in (discrete)
reality.
Considering a closed system is also idealistic, since it is rarely possible to isolate self-contained
economic systems completely. This model aspect may, however, be considered justified in this
case, since it represents the simplest possible system, and is commonly used in theoretical models
of economic systems [6, 19, 75].
The choice of the notion of space in the models of this chapter corresponds to what is known as
the parade approach [39], as opposed to working with frequency distributions, which translate
into probability density distributions in the continuous case. The parade approach corresponds
to the thought experiment of parading a population in a long single-file line arranged according to
nondecreasing wealth, with each person’s height representing his or her wealth. This approach is
intuitively more appealing than the alternative of frequency space. While the use of a continuous
function over this space does, in a sense, correspond to a probabilistic interpretation, there exists
an exact range of possible wealth levels, which is not necessarily the case when working with
a probability density distribution. These approaches can, however, be shown to be equivalent,
using a simple transform, as was demonstrated in §4.3.
The simple per capita wealth growth-rate function (4.16) that models the temporal evolution of
a wealth distribution over time is related to reality only in mimicking the expected behaviours
resulting from three different notions: First, that of increasing relative inequality over time in
the absence of redistribution, secondly, that the attained growth rate at a wealth level depends
on the total wealth and, finally, that increases in inequality result in decreased growth prospects
at fixed wealth levels. A linear function of wealth was chosen for its simplicity and not because
this is expected to be related to reality. The deductions made from the analysis in the following
chapters therefore indicate potential behaviours resulting from these notions, and not predictions
of behaviours which will necessarily follow in reality.
4.7 Chapter summary
Two mathematical models of wealth distribution were derived in this chapter. First, the un-
derlying model assumptions were noted and motivated, after which the mathematical model
derivations were carried out. Metrics for characterising the extent of equality present in model
solutions were then defined and their equivalence with traditional measures of wealth distribu-
tion was demonstrated. This was followed by a brief discussion on the interpretation and use of
these metrics. The per capita wealth growth-rate functions to be considered later in this thesis,
in the context of the models derived earlier, were then introduced. The existence and uniqueness
of the models’ solutions were established and it was demonstrated that these solutions, as well
as their first derivatives in space, remain nonnegative for all time. The models’ limitations and
intended use were finally discussed in a formal model apology.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTER 5
Conditions for bounded inequality
Contents
5.1 Preliminary analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.2 Conditions for nonincreasing inequality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
5.3 Numerical examples . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.4 Chapter summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
In this chapter, sufficient conditions are derived for bounded inequality of wealth. The aim is
to show analytically, within the context of the models of Chapter 4, that it is always possible
to redistribute wealth in a manner that prohibits increases in wealth inequality. In other words,
the stabilising nature of the redistribution terms in the models of Chapter 4 can always be made
to dominate the instability of the reaction terms (wealth growth functions). First, a number
of useful lemmas are established which are used in proofs of subsequent results. Conditions
for bounded relative inequality are then considered, and this is followed by the establishment
of conditions for bounded absolute inequality. The analytic results of the chapter are finally
illustrated numerically.
5.1 Preliminary analysis
The change in mean or total wealth of a distribution is of considerable interest in analyses
of economic growth over time. The following Lemma relates the rate of change in the total
population wealth to the type of per capita growth-rate function.
Lemma 5.1 The rate of change in total wealth in (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5) is given by
µ′(t) =
∫
D
wf(w) dλ.
Proof. By definition,
µ′(t) =
∫
D
∂w
∂t
dλ,
53
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and upon substitution of (4.1),
µ′(t) =
∫
D
(
wf(w) + d
∂2w
∂λ2
)
dλ
=
∫
D
wf(w) dλ+ d
∫
D
∂2w
∂λ2
dλ (5.1)
=
∫
D
wf(w) dλ+ d
(
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
− ∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
)
(5.2)
=
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
by utilisation of the fundamental theorem of the calculus (see Theorem 3.2) in (5.1) and the
boundary conditions (4.2) in (5.2).
Furthermore, in the case of (4.4),
µ′(t) =
∫
D
∂w
∂t
dλ
=
∫
D
wf(w) + d(µ− w) dλ
=
∫
D
wf(w) dλ+ dµ− d
∫
D
w dλ (5.3)
=
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
upon substitution of (4.6) into (5.3).
The rate of change in relative inequality will be used in arguments related to upward or downward
trends in relative inequality later in this chapter.
Lemma 5.2 The rate of change in relative inequality for the initial-boundary value problem
(4.1)–(4.3) or the initial value problem (4.4)–(4.5) is given by
V
′
(t) =
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− dr(t)
]
, (5.4)
where r(t) =
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ in the case of (4.1) and r(t) = V (t) in the case of (4.4) represents
the effect of redistribution.
Proof. In the case of both the models (4.1)–(4.3) and (4.4)–(4.5), it follows that
V
′
(t) =
−2µ′
µ3
∫
D
w2 dλ+
2
µ2
∫
D
w
∂w
∂t
dλ. (5.5)
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So, by using Lemma 5.1 and substituting (4.1) into (5.5), it follows that
V
′
(t) =
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w
(
wf(w) + d
∂2w
∂λ2
)
dλ
]
=
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2f(w) dλ+ d
∫
D
w
∂2w
∂λ2
dλ
]
(5.6)
=
2
µ2
[
−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2f(w) dλ
+ d
(
w
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣λ=1
λ=0
−
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ
)]
(5.7)
=
2
µ2
[
−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− d
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ
]
in the case of (4.1)–(4.3) upon utilisation of the fundamental theorem of the calculus, as well as
integration by parts, in (5.6) and the boundary conditions (4.2) in (5.7).
Furthermore, by using Lemma 5.1 and substituting (4.4) into (5.5), it follows that
V
′
(t) =
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w (wf(w) + d(µ− w)) dλ
]
=
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2f(w) dλ+ d
(
µ
∫
D
w dλ−
∫
D
w2 dλ
)]
(5.8)
=
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2f(w) dλ
+ d
(
µ2 −
∫
D
w2 dλ
)]
(5.9)
=
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− dV (t)
]
upon substitution of (4.6) into (5.8) and (4.11) into (5.9).
The rates of change in absolute inequality in both the trickle-down and linear redistribution
models are to be used in subsequent arguments related to upward or downward trends in absolute
inequality. The following result is therefore useful.
Lemma 5.3 The rate of change in absolute inequality for the initial-boundary value problem
(4.1)–(4.3) or the initial value problem (4.4)–(4.5) is given by
V ′(t) = 2
[∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ− dr(t)
]
,
where r(t) =
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ in the case of (4.1) and r(t) = V (t) in the case of (4.4).
Proof. In the case of both the models (4.1)–(4.3) and (4.4)–(4.5), it holds that
V ′(t) = 2
∫
D
(w − µ)
(
∂w
∂t
− µ′
)
dλ
= 2
∫
D
(
w
∂w
∂t
− µ′w − µ∂w
∂t
+ µµ′
)
dλ. (5.10)
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By using Lemma 5.1 substituting and (4.1) into (5.10), it follows, performing integration by
parts, that
V ′(t) = 2
[∫
D
w
(
wf(w) + d
∂2w
∂λ2
)
dλ−
(∫
D
w dλ
)(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)
− µ
∫
D
(
wf(w) + d
∂2w
∂λ2
)
dλ+ µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
]
(5.11)
= 2
[∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ+ d
(∫
D
w
∂2w
∂λ2
dλ+
∫
D
∂2w
∂λ2
dλ
)]
(5.12)
= 2
[∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
+ d
(
w
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣λ=1
λ=0
−
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ+
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
− ∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
)]
. (5.13)
Substitution of (4.6) into (5.11) and utilisation of the fundamental theorem of the calculus (see
Theorem 3.2) in (5.12) as well as the boundary conditions (4.2) in (5.13) therefore yield
V ′(t) = 2
[∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ− d
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ
]
in the case of (4.1)–(4.3). By using Lemma 5.1 and substituting (4.4) into (5.10) instead, it
follows that
V ′(t) = 2
[∫
D
w[wf(w) + d(µ− w)] dλ−
(∫
D
w dλ
)(∫
D
wf(w) dλ
)
− µ
∫
D
[wf(w) + d(µ− w)] dλ+ µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
]
(5.14)
= 2
[∫
D
w2f(w) dλ+ d
(
µ
∫
D
w dλ−
∫
D
w2 dλ
)
− 2µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
− d
(
µ2 − µ
∫
D
w dλ
)
+ µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
]
(5.15)
= 2
[∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ+ d
(
µ2 −
∫
D
w2 dλ
)]
(5.16)
= 2
[∫
D
w2f(w) dλ− µ
∫
D
wf(w) dλ− dV (t)
]
upon substitution of (4.6) into (5.14) and (5.15), and substitution of (4.11) into (5.16).
5.2 Conditions for nonincreasing inequality
The per capita wealth growth-rate functions considered in this section are all special cases of
(4.16). Substituting (4.16) into (4.1) yields the initial-boundary value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= w(a+ bw − cµ− kV ) + d∂
2w
∂λ2
λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0, (5.17)
B.C.
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0, t ≥ 0, (5.18)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D, (5.19)
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whereas substituting (4.16) into (4.4) yields the initial value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= w(a+ bw − cµ− kV ) + d[µ(t)− w(λ, t)] λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0, (5.20)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D. (5.21)
Lemma 5.4 Let w(λ, t) be the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5). Then the change
in the total population wealth over time is given by
µ′(t) = [a− cµ− kV ]µ+ b
∫
D
w2 dλ.
Proof. According to Lemma 5.1 the change in the mean wealth is given by
µ′(t) =
∫
D
wf(w) dλ
=
∫
D
(aw + bw2 − cµw − kV w) dλ
= (a− cµ− kV )µ+ b
∫
D
w2 dλ.
As a validation of the model logic, it is deduced from Lemma 5.4 that for the simple case of
constant per capita growth (where b = c = k = 0 and a 6= 0) the total population wealth is
an exponential function of time. In this simple case, the rate of growth of population wealth is
independent of the local distribution of wealth.
A necessary and sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality over time is now presented.
Proposition 5.1 (A condition for nonincreasing relative wealth inequality)
Let w(λ, t) be the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5). Then the relative inequality over
w(λ, t) is a strictly decreasing function of time at time t if and only if
dr > b
[∫
D
w3dλ− 1
µ
(∫
D
w2dλ
)2]
. (5.22)
Proof. If, and only if, (5.22) holds, it follows from Lemmas 5.2 and 5.4 that
V
′
(t) =
2
µ2
[−1
µ
(∫
D
w(a+ bw − cµ− kV ) dλ
)(∫
D
w2 dλ
)
+
∫
D
w2(a+ bw − cµ− kV ) dλ− dr(t)
]
=
2
µ2
[
−1
µ
(∫
D
w2 dλ
)[
(a− cµ− kV )µ+ b
∫
D
w2 dλ
]
+ (a− cµ− kV )
∫
D
w2 dλ+ b
∫
D
w3 dλ− dr(t)
]
=
2
µ2
[
b
∫
D
w3 dλ− b
µ
(∫
D
w2 dλ
)2
− dr(t)
]
< 0.
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It is expected that, since relative inequality is invariant under multiplication by a constant,
relative inequality should be decreasing (and constant only in the case of total equality) in the
presence of redistribution for the case of constant per capita growth. This expectation is verified
in the following corollary.
Corollary 5.1 (A sufficient condition for nonincreasing inequality in a model special case)
Let w(λ, t) be the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5). If b = c = k = 0, a 6= 0 and
d > 0, then V
′
(t) ≤ 0.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 5.1 that for b = 0, relative inequality is nonincreasing over
time, that is V
′
(t) < 0, if dr(t) > 0. In the case of (5.17), r(t) =
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ, which is
nonnegative by definition, and strictly positive if V (t) > 0, since positive variance implies that
the spatial derivative of w is nonzero somewhere in D. Furthermore, in the case of (5.20),
r(t) = V (t) and the desired result follows immediately.
An easily verifiable sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality of wealth in the initial-
boundary value problem (5.17)–(5.19) may be derived from Proposition 5.1.
Corollary 5.2 (A sufficient condition for nonincreasing wealth inequality)
Let w(λ, t) be the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.3). If
d[wmax(t)− wmin(t)]2 > b
[
w3max(t)−
w4min(t)
wmax(t)
]
(5.23)
at some time t, then V
′
(t) < 0.
Proof. It follows from the Cauchy-Buniakovskii-Schwarz inequality (see Corollary 3.1) and by
Proposition 4.3 that
r(t) =
∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)2
dλ ≥
[∫
D
(
∂w
∂λ
)
dλ
]2
= [w(1, t)− w(0, t)]2 = [wmax(t)− wmin(t)]2.
Suppose that (5.23) holds. Then, by Propositions 4.3 and 5.1,
V
′
(t) =
2
µ2
[
b
∫
D
w3 dλ− b
µ
(∫
D
w2 dλ
)2
− dr(t)
]
≤ 2
µ2
[
bw3(1, t)− bw
4(0, t)
w(1, t)
− d[wmax(t)− wmin(t)]2
]
=
2
µ2
[
bw3max(t)− b
w4min(t)
wmax(t)
− d[wmax(t)− wmin(t)]2
]
< 0.
The significant implication of Corollary 5.2 is that in the context of the models in this thesis, a
redistribution rate which ensures nonincreasing relative inequality can be determined using only
the extremal values of the wealth distribution.
Absolute inequality is now considered. Although the primary focus in this thesis is on relative
inequality, it is expected that the treatment of absolute inequality may contribute to the reader’s
understanding of the difference between the two concepts (hence clarifying the precise meaning
of relative inequality), and therefore be beneficial.
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Proposition 5.2 (A condition for nonincreasing absolute wealth inequality)
Let w(λ, t) be the unique solution to (4.1)–(4.3) or (4.4)–(4.5). Then the absolute inequality over
w(λ, t) is a strictly decreasing function of time at some time t if and only if
dr > (a− cµ− kV )V + b
(∫
D
w3 dλ− µ
∫
D
w2 dλ
)
. (5.24)
Proof. If, and only if, (5.24) is satisfied, it follows form Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4 that
V ′(t) = 2
[∫
D
w2(a+ bw − cµ− kV ) dλ− µ
∫
D
w(a+ bw − cµ− kV ) dλ− dr(t)
]
(5.25)
= 2
[
(a− cµ− kV )
∫
D
w2 dλ+ b
∫
D
w3 dλ− (a− cµ− kV )µ2 − bµ
∫
D
w2 dλ− dr(t)
]
= 2
[
(a− cµ− kV )
(∫
D
w2 dλ− µ2
)
+ b
(∫
D
w3 dλ− µ
∫
D
w2 dλ
)
− dr(t)
]
(5.26)
= 2
[
(a− cµ− kV )V + b
(∫
D
w3 dλ− µ
∫
D
w2 dλ
)
− dr(t)
]
< 0 (5.27)
upon substitution of (4.11) into (5.26).
It should be noted that the parameters a, c and k explicitly influence the change in absolute
inequality over time, although this is not the case with relative inequality. Furthermore, finding a
nontrivial sufficient condition for decreasing absolute inequality without utilising a distributional
metric, such as the variance, cannot be done as easily as in the case of relative inequality.
5.3 Numerical examples
The conditions for decreasing relative inequality in §5.2 are illustrated in this section by means
of numerical examples.
First, the result of Proposition 5.1 is illustrated by plotting the normalised variance of wealth
over time as well as both sides of the inequality (5.22), for instances of both the trickle-down
model and the linear redistribution model. This is done for the simple per capita wealth growth-
rate function (4.14), shown in Figure 5.1. It may be verified that the location in time of the
extremal points in Figures 5.22 (c) correspond to the crossing of the plots in Figures 5.22 (b). As
expected, relative inequality decreases over time in the solutions to both the trickle-down model
and the linear redistribution model while dr(t) is greater than the right-hand side of (5.22).
It is demonstrated next that the sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality of Corol-
lary 5.2 is not necessary. The same linear per capita wealth growth-rate function is employed as
in the previous example and a large redistribution rate is chosen to ensure that (5.23) is satisfied
initially. Relative inequality is decreasing over the time interval [0, 5] in Figure 5.2(c), yet (5.23)
is satisfied only on the first half of this interval in Figure 5.2(b). It may therefore be concluded
that (5.23) need not be satisfied for relative inequality to decrease over time.
Finally, the necessary and sufficient condition for decreasing absolute inequality of Proposi-
tion 5.2 is illustrated for both models. The solution variance, as well the left and right-hand
sides of the inequality (5.24), are plotted over time in Figure 5.3. It is apparent that equality
of the left and right-hand side components of (5.24) in Figure 5.3(b) correspond to an extremal
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(a) Trickle-down model (a) Linear redistribution model
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(b) Trickle-down model
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(b) Linear redistribution model
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b
[∫
D w
3 dλ− 1µ
(∫
D w
2 dλ
)2]
(c) Trickle-down model
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D w
3 dλ− 1µ
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D w
2 dλ
)2]
(c) Linear redistribution model
Figure 5.1: An example of necessary and sufficient conditions for decreasing relative inequality in the
models (4.1)–(4.3) and (4.4)–(4.5). The figures are based on numerical approximations of the model
solutions obtained by applying the method (3.29) in the case of the trickle-down model and Euler’s
method (3.27) in the case of the linear redistribution model, in both cases with step sizes 4t = 0.01 and
4λ = 1.25 × 10−3, and assuming the initial condition w0(λ) = exp(−10(λ − 1)2) and parameter values
a = −0.025 and b = 0.05. In the case of the trickle-down model, d = 1.2× 10−3, while in the case of the
linear redistribution model, d = 0.03.
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(a) Trickle-down model
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(b) Inequality (5.23) components
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(c) Relative inequality
Figure 5.2: An example of the sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality the model (4.1)–
(4.3). The figures are based on numerical approximations of the solution to (4.1)–(4.3) obtained by
applying the method (3.29) with step sizes 4t = 1 × 10−3 and 4λ = 0.0125, and assuming the initial
condition w0(λ) = exp(−10(λ− 1)2) and parameter values a = −0.025, b = 0.05 and d = 0.05.
point in the absolute inequality in Figure 5.3(c). Furthermore, while dr(t) dominates the right-
hand side of (5.24), absolute inequality decreases over time, as predicted by Proposition 5.2.
5.4 Chapter summary
The models derived in Chapter 4 were validated in this chapter by analysing their solution
behaviour for a constant per capita wealth growth rate. An expression for the change in total
wealth over time was derived for all per capita wealth growth-rate function types considered. A
necessary and sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality was established. An easily
verifiable sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality was derived from this necessary
and sufficient condition which depends only the extremal values of the wealth distribution. A
necessary and sufficient condition for decreasing absolute inequality was also established and the
differences between this condition and that for relative inequality was noted. Numerical examples
illustrating some of the analytic results established in this chapter were finally presented.
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(a) Trickle-down model (a) Linear redistribution model
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(b) Trickle-down model
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(b) Linear redistribution model
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(c) Trickle-down model
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(c) Linear redistribution model
Figure 5.3: An example of necessary and sufficient conditions for decreasing absolute inequality in the
models (4.1)–(4.3) and (4.4)–(4.5). The figures are based on numerical approximations of the model
solutions obtained by applying the method (3.29) in the case of the trickle-down model and Euler’s
method (3.27) in the case of the linear redistribution model, in both cases with step sizes 4t = 0.01 and
4λ = 1.25 × 10−3, and assuming the initial condition w0(λ) = exp(−10(λ − 1)2) and parameter values
a = −0.025 and b = 0.05. In the case of the trickle-down model, d = 1.6× 10−3, while in the case of the
linear redistribution model, d = 0.032.
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The long-time solution behaviour of the models of Chapter 4 is investigated in this chapter.
The per capita wealth growth-rate functions of §4.4 are considered in order of increasing com-
plexity. For the simple case of a linear per capita wealth growth rate, the relationship between
solution persistence and the redistribution rate is investigated. The stability of constant equi-
librium solutions is analysed and the existence of a spatially nonconstant equilibrium solution
to the trickle-down model is established. For the mean-dependent per capita wealth growth-
rate function, the stability of equilibrium solutions and the sizes of the basins of attraction of
stable equilibrium solutions are investigated numerically. The relationship between the char-
acteristics of the nonconstant equilibrium solution and the redistribution rate is considered.
Conjectures based on the findings of the numerical experiments are put forward. For the mean
and inequality-dependent per capita wealth growth-rate function, possible solution behaviours
are demonstrated numerically. Throughout, observations related to possible implications for
economic systems are noted, to be elaborated on in the subsequent chapter.
6.1 Linear per capita wealth growth
In this section, the special case of (4.16) where c = k = 0 is considered; this corresponds to the
growth function (4.14). In the case of the trickle-down model (4.1)–(4.3), substituting (4.14)
into (4.1) gives rise to the initial-boundary value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= w(a+ bw) + d
∂2w
∂λ2
λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0, (6.1)
B.C.
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0, t ≥ 0, (6.2)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D. (6.3)
63
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 Chapter 6. Long-time solution behaviour
In the case of the global redistribution model (4.4)–(4.5), substitution of (4.14) into (4.4) yields
the initial value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= w(a+ bw) + d[µ(t)− w(λ, t)] λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0 (6.4)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D. (6.5)
Since the focus here is on linear per capita growth rates with b > 0, and since wealth is nonneg-
ative by Proposition 4.2, the population per capita growth rate for a positive total wealth is not
less than a. If a is nonnegative, then more redistribution therefore results in a lower positive
population wealth growth rate. If a < 0, and a portion of the population possesses wealth levels
below wc = −a/b, however, then the population wealth growth rate may be negative, causing
the population wealth to tend to zero over time. It is not unreasonable to assume that there
exists such a critical wealth level, below which an entity’s wealth is unable to grow. Persons
whose living expenses equal or exceed their total income, or businesses whose operating expenses
exceed their income, are examples of entities below such a critical level. Furthermore, if wealth
growth in the models of Chapter 4 is viewed as growth in value (therefore growth measured
in monetary value discounted according to inflation), then it is reasonable to expect that cer-
tain entities should experience a decline in wealth over time, since not all persons or businesses
experience monetary growth greater than inflation at all times.
It is of interest to establish exactly under which conditions the persistence of population wealth
may be threatened. Cases where a < 0 and w0(0) < −a/b < w0(1) must therefore be considered.
If all entities have less wealth than the critical wealth (that is, −a/b > w0(1)), then the entire
population will experience negative growth for all time, while if all entities have more wealth
than the critical wealth (that is, −a/b < w0(0)), then the entire population will experience
positive growth for all time. It is shown first that, for any initial distribution satisfying w0(0) <
−a/b < w0(1), a redistribution rate d exists below which increasing total population wealth is
guaranteed as t→∞. In other words, if a proportion of entities, no matter how small, possess
wealth above the critical wealth, then their wealth positions can increase over time, given that
the net influence of redistribution is smaller than this growth.
Proposition 6.1 If a < 0 and b > 0 in (6.1)–(6.3) or (6.4)–(6.5), and w0(1) > −a/b, then
there exists a redistribution rate d∞ > 0 such that µ(t)→∞ as t→∞ for all d ∈ [0, d∞).
Proof. The evolution of wealth over time in both (6.1)–(6.3) and (6.4)–(6.5) is governed by the
equation
∂w
∂t
= aw + bw2 + dR(w).
It follows from the existence of classical solutions to (6.1)–(6.3) and (6.4)–(6.5) that
|R(w)| ≤M
on some time interval [0, Tmax), where Tmax and M are positive real numbers.
The inequality
∂w
∂t
> aw(λ, t) + bw2(λ, t)− dM (6.6)
then represents a lower bound on ∂w/∂t at a given time t ∈ [0, Tmax) and position λ. If
d <
1
M
(awc + bw
2
c ), (6.7)
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where wc = −a/b denotes the critical wealth, then it follows that ∂w/∂t > 0 for all w > wc.
According to Euler’s method,
w(λ, t+4t) = w(λ, t) +4t∂w(λ, t)
∂t
+
4t2
2
∂2w(λ, t+ α4t)
∂t2
,
for some α ∈ [0, 1], and so there exists a range of values for4t, such that w(λ, t+4t) > w(λ, t) for
all λ ∈ (w−1(wc, t), 1], where w−1 is the inverse function of w such that w(λ, t) = w−1(w(λ, t), t).
Hence, the positive lower bound on ∂w/∂t on the interval λ ∈ (w−10 (wc), 1] increases over any
time interval when (6.7) is satisfied. It therefore follows that
∫ 1
w−10 (wc)
w(λ, t) dλ→∞ as t→∞,
and since w(λ, t) > 0, it follows that µ(t)→∞ as t→∞.
In the cases under consideration, it is therefore always possible to select a redistribution rate such
that population wealth persists over time. It is now established exactly when the population
wealth can tend to zero. First, however, a property of the redistributive term is established
which is to be used in the proof of the subsequent proposition.
Lemma 6.1 In solutions to (6.1)–(6.3) or (6.4)–(6.5) the redistribution term satisfies R(w) ≤ 0
at λ = 1.
Proof. If V (t) = 0, which implies that w is constant over D at time t, then R(w) = 0 at time t.
In the case of (6.1), the desired result follows since the first and second derivatives of a constant
are zero. In the case of (6.4), the mean of a constant function is equal to the function, and
therefore the difference between the function and its mean is zero. If V (t) > 0, then according
to Proposition 4.3 the maximum wealth in D at any time t is given by w(1, t). It follows from
the continuity of w that ∂2w/∂λ2 ≤ 0 at such a maximum, in the case of (6.1). Since the
maximum value of a function is not less than its mean, a nonpositive value is obtained when
subtracting the maximum from the mean and therefore the desired result also follows in the case
of (6.4).
Proposition 6.2 If a < 0 and b > 0 in (6.1)–(6.3) or (6.4)–(6.5), and
∫
D w0 dλ < −a/b, then
there exists a redistribution rate d0 such that µ(t)→ 0 as t→∞ for all d > d0.
Proof. Suppose, at an arbitrary time t = ta > 0, that the maximum wealth satisfies w(1, ta) <
wc. Then the change in population wealth, given by
µ′(t) =
∫
D
wf(w) dλ =
∫
D
w(a+ bw) dλ,
is negative at t = ta since a+ bw < 0 for all w. Furthermore, the change in maximum wealth is
also negative, since R(w) is nonpositive at the maximum wealth according to Lemma 6.1. Since
f ′(w) > 0, a decrease in wealth causes a decrease in the per capita wealth growth rate f , and it
therefore follows that the total wealth continues to decrease for all t > ta.
Suppose at time t = 0 that
∫
D w0 dλ < wc and that w0(1) > wc. Then, if
∂w
∂t
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
<
wc − w0(1)
ta
(6.8)
for all t ∈ [0, ta), it follows that w(1, ta) < wc. Let the maximum value of R(w) at λ = 1 over
all t ∈ [0, ta) be m (m < 0 according to Lemma 6.1). By selecting
d >
−1
m
(
aw0(1) + bw
2
0(1) +
w0(1)− wc
ta
)
,
the inequality (6.8) is satisfied for all t ∈ [0, ta).
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It has been established that there exist scenarios in the context of linear per capita wealth
growth rates where the persistence of population wealth hinges on the redistribution rate. If
the mean wealth is less than the critical wealth required for positive growth, µ(t) < wc, and
therefore the growth function evaluated at the mean wealth is negative (that is, f(µ(t)) < 0),
it follows that excessive redistribution will result in a continuous decline in population wealth.
If a portion of entities possess more than the critical wealth, such that w(1, t) > 0, it has
also been established that the population wealth may increase continually when the extent of
redistribution is sufficiently limited. Hence it follows that there exists a critical redistribution
rate dc ∈ (d∞, d0), which causes the mean wealth to tend to a constant value as t → ∞. The
following corollary therefore follows immediately from Propositions 6.1 and 6.2.
Corollary 6.1 Suppose that a < 0, µ(0) < wc and w0(1) > wc, where wc = −a/b. Then there
exists a dc ∈ (d∞, d0) such that µ(t)→ µe as t→∞, and therefore ∂w/∂t→ 0 as t→∞, where
µe ∈ (0, wc] is a constant.
The critical redistribution rate dc of Corollary 6.1 can easily be approximated numerically using
an iterative search technique. Examples of such critical redistribution rates are illustrated in
Figure 6.1 for the parameter values and initial condition in Table 6.1.
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(a) Trickle-down model
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(b) Linear redistribution model
Figure 6.1: Population wealth over time for linearly increasing per capita wealth growth rates and
wealth distributed around a critical wealth level. The figures are based on numerical approximations
of the model solutions obtained by applying the method (3.29) in the case of the trickle-down model
and Euler’s method (3.27) in the case of the linear redistribution model, in both cases with step sizes
4t = 0.01 and 4λ = 1.25× 10−3, and assuming the initial conditions and parameter values in Table 6.1.
Parameter Value
a −2× 10−2
b 5× 10−2
−a/b 0.4
w0(λ) exp(−10(λ− 1)2)
Table 6.1: Parameter values used to illustrate possible solution behaviours for linear per capita wealth
growth rates when a < 0 and w0(0) < −a/b < w0(1).
If the persistence of population wealth is a requirement (as it should be), the existence of a
critical redistribution rate imposes a limit on the maximum permissible redistribution rate.
When w0 is increased (uniformly or proportionally), and f is unchanged, then the value of dc in
Corollary 6.1 increases, as evident in Table 6.2. The associated trends in mean wealth are shown
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in Figure 6.2. This phenomenon is intuitive, since in the context of this growth function, an
increase in wealth causes an increase in the growth of wealth. An economy with better growth
prospects can therefore redistribute to a greater extent, without inducing an adverse downward
trend over time in the total population wealth.
Initial condition Trickle-down dc Linear redistribution dc
w0 3.06514× 10−3 4.60199× 10−2
w0 + 0.05 4.81074× 10−3 6.38550× 10−2
w0 + 0.1 1.43330× 10−2 1.72102× 10−1
1.1w0 4.47938× 10−3 6.14207× 10−2
1.2w0 7.05309× 10−2 9.06162× 10−2
Table 6.2: Estimated critical redistribution rates for the parameters in Table 6.1.
The following observation related to the Robin Hood paradox follows from the existence of the
critical redistribution rate of Corollary 6.1.
Observation 6.1 Consider several hypothetical societies, each having a different total wealth
level and each pursuing two economic aims. The first aim is nonnegative growth of total wealth
and therefore the persistence of population wealth over time, and the second aim is the pursuit
of increased economic equality within each society. These societies may then be described as
egalitarian in a pragmatic sense. If the existence of increasing per capita wealth growth rates and
a critical wealth requirement for positive growth are accepted, then the extent of redistribution
present in economies with worse growth prospects (with mean wealth levels below the critical
wealth) will be less than that present in economies with more promising growth prospects.
If it is furthermore accepted that the growth prospects of very economically unequal societies are
worse than those of more equal societies, as suggested in the literature reviewed in §2.2, then the
Robin Hood paradox can follow necessarily under the assumptions outlined in Observation 6.1.
The positive equilibrium solutions in the context of linear increasing per capita wealth growth
rates, achieved when d = dc, exhibit unstable behaviour. This is to be expected since a positive
(or negative) perturbation results in an increase (or a decrease) in ∂w/∂t. While reference to
this steady state solution is useful as the boundary of separation between two distinct solution
behaviours, it is not of practical interest. Unstable steady state solutions do not manifest
themselves in reality, or even in numerical approximations. The stability (or otherwise) of the
constant equilibrium solutions to (6.1)–(6.3) is now established analytically.
Let we denote an equilibrium solution to (6.1)–(6.3) and let v(λ, t) be a function representing a
perturbation from this equilibrium. Any solution may then be expressed in the form
w(λ, t) = we(λ) + v(λ, t), (6.9)
where  is a positive real number. Upon substitution of (6.9) into (6.1), it follows that
∂
∂t
(we + v) = a(we + v) + b(we + v)
2 + d
∂2
∂λ2
(we + v)
and so

∂v
∂t
= 
(
av + 2bwev + d
∂2v
∂λ2
)
+ b2v2,
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(c) Trickle-down model
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
0.3
0.32
0.34
0.36
0.38
0.4
0.42
t
µ
(t
)
 
 
w0
1.1w0
1.2w0
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Figure 6.2: Population wealth over time for linearly increasing per capita wealth growth rates, wealth
distributed around a critical wealth level and a critical redistribution rate. The figures are based on
numerical approximations of the model solutions obtained by applying the method (3.29) in the case of
the trickle-down model and Euler’s method (3.27) in the case of the linear redistribution model, in both
cases with step sizes 4t = 0.01 and 4λ = 1.25×10−3, and assuming the initial conditions and parameter
values in Table 6.1.
which may be linearised to approximate solutions to (6.1)–(6.3) at equilibrium points. If this is
done, the perturbation v satisfies
∂v
∂t
= av + 2bwev + d
∂2v
∂λ2
. (6.10)
Imposing the boundary conditions (6.3) on (6.9), that is
∂
∂λ
(we + v)
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
∂
∂λ
(we + v)
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0,
yields
∂v
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
∂v
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0. (6.11)
Separation of variables may be applied to (6.10). Let v(λ, t) = X(λ)T (t). Then (6.10) becomes
XT ′ = (a+ 2bwe)XT + dX ′′T,
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which may be rearranged as
T ′
T
= a+ 2bwe + d
X ′′
X
= c1, (6.12)
where c1 is a constant.
Therefore, T (t) = c2e
c1t, where c2 is a constant, and
X ′′ +
1
d
(a+ 2bwe − c1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕ2
X = 0.
For we a constant, the cases ϕ
2 < 0, ϕ = 0 and ϕ > 0 are considered separately. If ϕ2 < 0, then
X(λ) = Aeϕt +Be−ϕt, where A and B are constants. Imposing the boundary conditions (6.11)
yields the trivial solution since A = B = 0.
If ϕ = 0 (i.e. c1 = a+2bwe), then X(λ) = Aλ+B. The boundary conditions require that A = 0,
and hence that X(λ) = B. The general solution is then given by
v(λ, t) = Ce(a+2bwe)t, (6.13)
where C = c2B.
Finally, if ϕ > 0, then X(λ) = A cos(ϕλ) +B sin(ϕλ). Imposing the boundary conditions yields
B = 0 and ϕ = npi for n ∈ {1, 2, . . . }. Therefore, c1 = a + 2bwe − dn2pi2. The general solution
is then given by
v(λ, t) =
∞∑
n=1
Ane
(a+2bwe−dn2pi2)t cos(npiλ). (6.14)
The linear stability of a constant equilibrium solution is established by interpreting the sign
of c1 at the equilibrium solution. It is apparent from (6.13) and (6.14) that for a < 0, the
equilibrium solution we(λ) = 0 is linearly stable since c1 < 0. The solution we(λ) = −a/b is,
however, unstable, since (6.13) simplifies to v(λ, t) = Ce−at, which grows arbitrarily large over
time when a < 0.
The existence of a third equilibrium solution to (6.1)–(6.3), which is not constant over space, is
now established.
Proposition 6.3 For any a < 0, b > 0 and w(0, t) ∈ (0,−a/b), there exists a nonconstant
steady state solution to the model (6.1)–(6.3).
Proof. A steady state solution to (6.1)–(6.3) is also a solution to the two-point boundary value
problem
D.E.
d2w
dλ2
=
−w
d
(a+ bw) (6.15)
B.C.
dw
dλ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
dw
dλ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0, (6.16)
and a solution to this boundary value problem is a steady state solution to (6.1)–(6.3) if it is
nondecreasing, according to Proposition 4.3.
By inspection, w = 0 and w = −a/b are solutions to (6.15)–(6.16), and steady state solutions
to (6.1)–(6.3). The existence of a third solution is now established. Let dw/dλ = q. Then
dq
dw
q =
−w
d
(a+ bw)
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and so ∫
q dq =
−1
d
∫
aw + bw2 dw,
from which it follows that
q2 =
−1
d
(
aw2 +
2bw3
3
)
+ c3,
where c3 is a constant. According to the boundary condition dw/dλ = q = 0 at w(0) = wmin,
c3 =
−1
d
(
aw2min +
2bw3min
3
)
.
Therefore,
q2 =
−1
d
(
aw2 +
2bw3
3
− aw2min −
2bw3min
3
)
,
and so it follows that
q =
√
−1
d
(
aw2 +
2bw3
3
− aw2min −
2bw3min
3
)
,
because of the nonnegativity of dw/dλ. Let h(w) = q2. Then
h′(w) =
−2w
d
(a+ bw).
Hence the cubic function h has extremal points at w = 0 and w = −a/b. Choosing wmin, which
is a root of h(w) = 0 by definition, in the interval (0,−a/b) therefore implies that wmin is the
central root of three distinct real roots of h(w), as illustrated in Figure 6.3. This also implies
that h(w) has two positive roots and one negative root. Upon factorisation,
h(w) =
−1
d
(w − wmin)
(
2bw2
3
+
(
a+
2bwmin
3
)
w +
(
a+
2bwmin
3
)
wmin
)
.
w
h(w)
−a
b
wmaxwmin0
Figure 6.3: The roots of h(w).
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Furthermore, q is real-valued on the interval [wmin, wmax], where wmax is the largest root of
h(w) = 0. Utilising the quadratic formula,
wmax =
−3b
4
(
a+
2bwmin
3
−
√
a2 − 4bwmin
3
(a+ bwmin)
)
.
Let L be the curve q on [wmin, wmax] and define
λ∗ =
∫
L
dλ
=
∫
L
(
dw
dλ
)−1 dw
dλ
dλ
=
∫ wmax
wmin
1
q
dw.
If λ∗ = 1, then the boundary conditions are satisfied since λ∗ represents the only point at which
dw/dλ becomes zero for w > wmin. This can always be achieved by selecting a suitable value
for d. Setting
∫ wmax
wmin
1
q
dw = 1,
it follows that ∫ wmax
wmin
[−1
d
(
aw2 +
2bw3
3
− aw2min −
2bw3min
3
)]− 1
2
dw = 1
and solving for d yields
d =
[∫ wmax
wmin
(
aw2 +
2bw3
3
− aw2min −
2bw3min
3
)− 1
2
dw
]−2
. (6.17)
The elliptic integral1 in (6.17) is convergent. Therefore, for any a < 0, b > 0, wmin ∈ (0,−a/b)
and d defined as in (6.17), there exists a nondecreasing, non-constant solution to the boundary
value problem (6.15)–(6.16) and therefore a steady state solution to (6.1)–(6.3).
Attention is now turned to the long-time solution behaviour of the model (6.4)–(6.5). First, the
behaviour of the differential equation is treated separately from the initial conditions.
Proposition 6.4 Equation (6.4) has, in addition to the trivial zero solution, one positive con-
stant equilibrium solution and infinitely many two-valued step-function equilibrium solutions for
a < 0, b > 0 and d > 0.
Proof. By inspection and from the definition of a steady state for (6.4),
aw + bw2 + d(µ− w) = 0, (6.18)
it follows that w = 0 and w = −a/b are solutions to (6.4). Since (6.18) is a quadratic equation
in w and µ(t) = µe is a constant at a steady state, the equation can have at most of two
1An elliptic integral is an integral of the form
∫
R(S, λ) dλ, where R is a rational function containing at least
one odd power of S and S2 is a cubic or quadratic function of λ with no repeated roots [1].
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distinct roots. It is now shown that step-function equilibrium solutions exist to (6.4) for every
µe ∈ (0,−a/b). Rearranging (6.18) as
bw2 + (a− d)w + dµe = 0, (6.19)
it follows that two distinct real solutions to (6.18) exist if (a− d)2 − 4bdµe > 0, that is, if
µe <
(a− d)2
4bd
. (6.20)
A steady state to (6.4) can only exist for µe ≤ −a/b. It is now demonstrated that this, in turn,
also ensures that (6.20) is satisfied. By definition 0 ≤ (d+ a)2, and upon expanding the square
and subtracting 4ad,
−4ad ≤ d2 − 2ad+ a2,
and since both d and b are positive, this can be written as
−a
b
≤ (d− a)
2
4bd
.
For any µe ∈ (0,−a/b), the steady state function values are therefore
w1 =
1
2b
(
d− a−
√
(a− d)2 − 4bdµe
)
and
w2 =
1
2b
(
d− a+
√
(a− d)2 − 4bdµe
)
.
Assuming an increasing step function, a steady state solution to (6.4) is therefore given by
w(λ) =
{
w1 if 0 ≤ λ ≤ µe−w2w1−w2
w2 if
µe−w2
w1−w2 < λ ≤ 1
(6.21)
for any µe ∈ (0,−a/b).
The initial conditions (6.5) ensure that the model (6.4)–(6.5) possesses continuous solutions,
and therefore the step function steady state solutions (6.21) are not solutions of (6.4)–(6.5).
Corollary 6.2 The model (6.4)–(6.5), with a < 0, b > 0 and d > 0 possesses only two steady
state solutions, given by w = 0 and w = −a/b. Of these, the former is stable, while the latter is
unstable.
In summary, the solutions of the models (6.1)–(6.3) and (6.4)–(6.5) either tend to zero or grow
without bound over time, since all positive equilibrium solutions are unstable.
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6.2 Mean-dependent per capita wealth growth
In this section, possible solution behaviours of the wealth distribution and redistribution models
are investigated for a specific mean-dependent per capita wealth growth-rate function. Sub-
stitution of the per capita growth-rate function (4.15) into (4.1)–(4.3) gives rise to the initial-
boundary value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= w(a+ bw − cµ) + d∂
2w
∂λ2
λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0, (6.22)
B.C.
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0, t ≥ 0, (6.23)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D, (6.24)
while substitution of (4.15) into (4.4)–(4.5) yields the initial value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= w(a+ bw − cµ) + d[µ(t)− w(λ, t)] λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0 (6.25)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D. (6.26)
It can be demonstrated numerically that the simple addition of the cµ-term to the linear per
capita wealth growth-rate function creates stable steady state solutions for a large class of
parameter combinations. If a > 0, then solutions to (6.22)–(6.24) or (6.25)–(6.26) cannot tend
to zero. This is evident from the reaction term w(a + bw − cµ), since as w becomes small, a
dominates, and so the reaction term is positive for small values of w when a > 0.
If b ≥ c, then solutions to (6.22)–(6.24) or (6.25)–(6.26) grow unbounded. Since per capita
growth rates are increasing, the slowest possible growth rate for the total population wealth
occurs at total equality of wealth. This corresponds to the solution of the ODE initial value
problem
dw
dt
= aw + (b− c)w2, (6.27)
w(0) = µ(0) = w0, (6.28)
since µ = w when w is constant. It is therefore easily seen that even the slowest possible growth
corresponds to solutions growing unbounded if c ≤ b. Letting b < c creates a stable equilibrium
solution to (6.27) at w = a/(c − b). Hence there exist constant stable equilibrium solutions
to (6.22)–(6.24) and (6.25)–(6.26), since the redistribution term ensures regression to the mean
provided that perturbations are sufficiently small. Since the redistribution term in (6.25)–(6.26)
allows only constant equilibrium solutions, which are neither mathematically interesting nor
practically interpretable, this model is not analysed further.
The stability of the nonconstant equilibrium solution to (6.22)–(6.24) is of interest. The existence
of such a solution is guaranteed by Proposition 6.3. If an equilibrium solution to (6.1)–(6.3) has a
mean µe, then the same function is an equilibrium solution to (6.22)–(6.24) provided that a−cµe
in (6.22) replaces the value of a in (6.1). Analytically expressing this nonconstant equilibrium
solution or analysing its stability properties is, however, difficult. The following conjecture is
therefore substantiated numerically.
Conjecture 6.1 If a > 0, c > b > 0 and d > d∞ > 0, where d∞ is some lower bound required for
stability at the nonconstant equilibrium solution to (6.22)–(6.24), then there exists a nonempty
set W of C2 functions defined on D such that, for all w0 ∈ W, the solution w to (6.22)–(6.24)
tends to the nonconstant equilibrium solution as t→∞.
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The left-hand side portion of a Gaussian distribution is once again used to construct initial
conditions of the form (6.24). The mean and variance of such a distribution uniquely determine
an initial condition. Given a set of parameters and initial conditions which converge to a stable
equilibrium (such as for the parameters in Table 6.3 together with w0(λ) = exp(−(λ−1)2)), two
types of deviation in the initial conditions are investigated separately. First, the mean is kept
constant while the normalised variance is increased. In Figure 6.4 it may be seen that, for a
certain fixed mean wealth, the extent of inequality of an initial condition can determine whether
the associated solution converges to the equilibrium solution. Since solutions cannot tend to zero
in this case, either convergence to an asymptotically stable positive equilibrium or unbounded
growth is expected. More unequal distributions cause a larger rate of growth of population
wealth. Initial conditions which are more equally distributed than a given initial condition which
converges to the equilibrium are therefore expected also to lead to solutions which converge to
the same equilibrium solution. This expectation is made precise in the following conjecture.
Conjecture 6.2 Let X be the set of all possible initial conditions (6.24) defined by w0(λ) =
k1 exp(−k2(x − 1)2) for any k1, k2 > 0. If a given initial condition w∗0 of this form, with mean
µ∗ and normalised variance V ∗, is in W ∩ X (where W is as defined in Conjecture 6.1), then
all w ∈ X with µ = µ∗ and V ≤ V ∗ are in W.
Parameter Value
a 0.1
b 5× 10−2
c 0.5
d 5× 10−4
Table 6.3: Parameter values used to illustrate basin of attraction of equilibrium solutions to (6.22)–
(6.24).
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
t
µ
(t
)
(a) Mean wealth over time
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
t
V
(t
)
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Figure 6.4: Temporal evolution of wealth for initial left-half Gaussian distributions with differing levels
of inequality and the same mean for the parameter values in Table 6.3. The figures are based on numerical
approximations of solutions to the model (6.22)–(6.24) obtained by applying the method (3.29) with step
sizes 4t = 0.01 and 4λ = 1.25× 10−3.
Next the normalised variance is fixed and the mean wealth is adjusted. From Figure 6.5 it
is apparent that, for a fixed normalised variance, the mean wealth of an initial condition can
determine whether the associated solution converges to the equilibrium solution. It is therefore
concluded that whether or not a function is a member of W depends on both its shape and
vertical scale.
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
6.2. Mean-dependent per capita wealth growth 75
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
t
µ
(t
)
(a) Mean wealth over time
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
t
V
(t
)
(b) Normalised variance over time
Figure 6.5: Temporal evolution of wealth for initial left-half Gaussian distributions with differing
means and the same normalised variance for the parameter values in Table 6.3. The figures are based on
numerical approximations to the model (6.22)–(6.24) solutions by applying the method (3.29) with step
size 4t = 0.01 and 4λ = 1.25× 10−3.
Conjecture 6.3 If w∗0 ∈ X , w∗0 ∈ W and w∗0 has a mean µ∗ and normalised variance V ∗, then
all w ∈ X for which V = V ∗ and µ ≤ µ∗ are in W.
If Conjectures 6.1–6.3 hold, then any function that is dominated in terms of its mean and
normalised variance by a function in X ∩W (in the Pareto sense for a maximisation problem2),
is also in X ∩W.
The size of X ∩W can therefore in some sense be expressed in terms of the pairs of means and
normalised variances of functions in X which are on the boundary of the basin of attraction of
the equilibrium solution. It is expected that this size should increase with an increase in the
rate of redistribution. The greater the value of d, the greater the perturbation required from
an initial condition inside the basin of attraction so as to allow unstable growth in the reaction
term to dominate redistributive effects.
Conjecture 6.4 Let w∗0 be an initial condition of the form (6.24) and suppose {a, b, c, d} is a set
of positive parameters associated with (6.22), such that, for all w ∈ X with corresponding mean
µ > µ∗ and normalised variance V ≥ V ∗, or µ ≥ µ∗ and V > V ∗, w does not converge to the
equilibrium solution (w∗0 may then thought of as being ‘on the boundary’ ofW∩X ). Instead, there
exist initial conditions w′ ∈ X with µ′ > µ∗ and V ′ ≥ V ∗, or µ′ ≥ µ∗ and V ′ > V ∗, for which
the corresponding solutions to (6.22)–(6.24) converge to an equilibrium solution corresponding
to the parameter set {a, b, c, d′} where d′ > d.
Figure 6.6 depicts the mean wealth and normalised variance of initial conditions in X which
converge to an equilibrium solution related to the parameters in Table 6.3, for three different
values of d. It is apparent that an increase in d results in an associated increase in the size of
the region of means and normalised variances related to elements in X ∩W.
Thus far the investigation in this section has been centred on establishing the stability of non-
constant equilibrium solutions to (6.22)–(6.24), and the effect of varying rates of trickle-down
redistribution on the relative size of the basin of attraction to a nonconstant equilibrium so-
lution. Attention is now turned away from the initial conditions and to the effect that such
2Meaning that the two measures of the dominated function are both less than or equal to those of the function
in W, and one is strictly smaller.
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Figure 6.6: The means and normalised variances of selected elements of X ∩W for the parameter set
specified in Table 6.3, but for varying values of d. The figure is based on numerical approximations of
solutions to the model (6.22)–(6.24) obtained by applying the method (3.29) with step sizes 4t = 0.01
and 4λ = 1.25×10−3 up to time t = 2000, and observing whether unbounded growth above the constant
equilibrium occurs.
parameter variation has on the characteristics of the nonconstant equilibrium solution itself.
The parameter values in Table 6.3 are again assumed and estimates of the mean wealth and
normalised variance at the equilibrium are recorded for different redistribution rates. The re-
sults are depicted in Figure 6.7. The mean wealth at the nonconstant equilibrium solution tends
toward the constant equilibrium solution w = a/(c− b) (which equals 0.2˙ in this case), as shown
in Figure 6.7(b). As may be expected, the normalised variance tends to zero as d increases, as
shown in Figure 6.7(d).
Conjecture 6.5 Let a, b, c, d > 0 be a parameter set for which there exists a nonconstant
equilibrium solution to (6.22)–(6.24). Then the mean wealth at the nonconstant equilibrium
satisfies µe > a/(c − b). Furthermore, the mean wealth of the nonconstant equilibrium solution
to (6.22)–(6.24) associated with the parameter set a, b, c, d′ > 0 and d′ > d is µ′e < µe.
It then follows that the mean wealth at the nonconstant equilibrium solution can be made
arbitrarily close to the constant solution w = a/(c− b).
Conjecture 6.6 Given positive values of a, b and c for which an equilibrium solution to (6.22)–
(6.24) exists, there exists, for any  > 0, a value of d for which a/(c− b) < µe < a/(c− b) + .
The implications of the conjectures in this section are captured in the following remark.
Observation 6.2 In the presence of increasing per capita wealth growth rates, competition
resulting in decreased growth prospects at a fixed wealth level when the population wealth increases
and sufficient trickle-down redistribution, a stable, nonconstant equilibrium wealth distribution
exists. The stability of this equilibrium increases with greater trickle-down redistribution effects,
but the mean equilibrium wealth decreases with greater trickle-down redistribution.
There are two significant, and perhaps counter intuitive, insights to be gained from the conjec-
tures and observations of this section. The first is that a stable nonconstant equilibrium wealth
distribution exists, although the reaction term in the model is unstable in the sense that it is
an increasing function of wealth everywhere. Allowing an increasing linear per capita wealth
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Figure 6.7: The relationship between the redistribution rate, the mean wealth and the normalised
variance at the nonconstant equilibrium solution to (6.22)–(6.24) for the parameter values in Table 6.3.
The figures are based on numerical approximations of solutions to the model (6.22)–(6.24) obtained by
applying the method (3.29) with step sizes 4t = 5× 10−3 and 4λ = 1.25× 10−3.
growth-rate function to translate along the wealth axis, with translations proportional to the
mean wealth, is sufficient to render stable nonconstant equilibrium solutions. The implication of
this insight is that a system of this type need not be extremely fine-tuned (as no social system
can be) in order to be stable. There exists a large range of parameters and corresponding sets
of initial conditions that lead to stable equilibrium solutions.
The second insight is the fact that the mean wealth at a nonconstant equilibrium solution is
greater than the constant equilibrium solution. The implication is that even in a world of iden-
tical agents, the average agent is better off when wealth is not equally distributed. Greater
inequality is associated with a larger mean equilibrium wealth. The largest possible mean equi-
librium wealth is therefore associated with the highest possible level of inequality and the lowest
possible rate of redistribution, for an equilibrium solution corresponding to a given parameter
set. This latter state then forms the boundary of the basin of attraction, and is therefore not
stable.
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6.3 Mean and inequality-dependent per capita wealth growth
In this section, possible solution behaviours of the model (4.1)–(4.3) with the per capita growth-
rate function (4.16) are demonstrated by means of numerical simulations. The initial-boundary
value problem
D.E.
∂w
∂t
= w(a+ bw − cµ− kV ) + d∂
2w
∂λ2
λ ∈ D, t ≥ 0, (6.29)
B.C.
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=0
=
∂w
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=1
= 0, t ≥ 0, (6.30)
I.C. w(λ, 0) = w0(λ) ≥ 0, w′0(λ) ≥ 0, λ ∈ D (6.31)
is considered. Two distinct types of solution behaviour are demonstrated using the parameter
set labelled 1 in Table 6.4, for various redistribution rates and two values of k. It is apparent
from Figure 6.8 that stable positive equilibrium solutions exist, since the total wealth and nor-
malised variance both tend to constant values over time. For low redistribution rates, vanishing
oscillations are observed in both the mean wealth and normalised variance.
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(a) Mean wealth over time for different values
of d
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Figure 6.8: The relationship between the redistribution rate, the mean wealth and the normalised
variance at nonconstant equilibrium solutions to (6.29)–(6.31) for k = 4.9 × 10−2, parameter set 1 and
d ∈ {1, 1.25, 1.5, . . . , 4} × 10−3. The figures are based on numerical approximations of solutions to
the model (6.29)–(6.31) obtained by applying the method (3.29) with step sizes 4t = 5 × 10−3 and
4λ = 1.25× 10−3, and assuming the initial condition w0(λ) = exp(−10(λ− 1)2).
Parameter Set 1 Set 2 Set 3
a 5× 10−2 0.4129× 10−2 0.1× 10−2
b 2.5× 10−2 5.38× 10−2 5× 10−2
c 5× 10−2 0.5519 6.7× 10−2
k — 3.91× 10−2 0.1
d — — 3× 10−4
Table 6.4: Parameter sets used to illustrate solution behaviours for mean and inequality-dependent per
capita wealth growth rates.
In figure 6.9(a), the relationship between the mean wealth at the equilibrium solution and the
rate of redistribution is reversed from that of the previous section (see Figure 6.7(a)). The mean
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(a) Equilibrium mean wealth for different val-
ues of d and k = 4.9× 10−2
(b) Equilibrium mean wealth for different val-
ues of d and k = 4.85× 10−2
(c) Equlibrium normalised variance for differ-
ent values of d and k = 4.9× 10−2
(d) Equlibrium normalised variance for differ-
ent values of d and k = 4.85× 10−2
Figure 6.9: The relationship between the redistribution rate, the mean wealth and the normalised
variance at nonconstant equilibrium solutions resulting from parameter set 1 in Table 6.4. The figures
are based on numerical approximations of solutions to the model (6.22)–(6.24) obtained by applying the
method (3.29) with step sizes 4t = 5× 10−3 and 4λ = 1.25× 10−3.
equilibrium wealth is always less than the constant equilibrium (still given by w = a/(c − b)),
and increases, tending toward the constant solution, as d increases. This rather unsatisfactory
result suggests that more redistribution is always preferred, yielding total equality as the best
possible state, and providing no real new insights. Fascinating solution behaviour however
occurs when k is decreased slightly. In Figure 6.9(b), the mean equilibrium wealth rises above
the constant equilibrium at around d ≈ 3 × 10−3, and then tends toward w = a/(c − b) from
above as d increases. This suggests that there exists a unique, finite redistribution rate d at
which a maximum mean equilibrium wealth is achieved. It is also remarkable that, as d increases,
this maximum mean wealth occurs after a rather abrupt decrease in the normalised variance.
The largest possible mean is therefore not achieved at the highest possible level of inequality
associated with an equilibrium solution corresponding to a given parameter set (and any value
of d), neither is it achieved at the lowest possible level of inequality (the constant equilibrium
solution).
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Parameter combinations which yield the latter behaviour were sought using a random search
technique. An example solution (Set 2 in 6.4) which clearly exhibits a unique maximum mean
equilibrium wealth is shown in Figure 6.10. It is also apparent that the maximum mean equi-
librium wealth is not achieved at the highest level of inequality associated with equilibrium
solutions for this parameter set and any value of d. This leads to the following insight.
(a) Equilibrium mean wealth for different val-
ues of d
(b) Equilibrium normalised variance for differ-
ent values of d
Figure 6.10: The relationship between the redistribution rate, the mean wealth and the normalised
variance at nonconstant equilibrium solutions to (6.29)–(6.31) for k = 4.85 × 10−2 and parameter set 2
in Table 6.4. The figures are based on numerical approximations of solutions to the model (6.29)–(6.31)
obtained by applying the method (3.29) with step sizes 4t = 5× 10−3 and 4λ = 1.25× 10−3.
Observation 6.3 In the context of increasing per capita wealth growth rates and decreased
wealth growth prospects at a given fixed wealth level when either the mean wealth or the level
of inequality increases, there may exist an optimal redistribution rate and associated level of
inequality, which is not the highest level of possible stable inequality, for which the expected wealth
of each entity in the economic system is maximised, and for which the associated equilibrium
distribution is stable.
A conclusion drawn from the preceding section was that greater inequality at an equilibrium
yields a greater, but less stable, mean wealth. This suggested that there exists a tradeoff
between lowering inequality and seeking stability on the one hand, and maximizing the mean
wealth on the other. The limiting case yielding the largest possible equilibrium wealth in the
preceding section therefore forms the boundary of the basin of attraction for a given parameter
set, and is hence unstable. The implication is that the maximum possible equilibrium wealth
is unattainable if stability is required, and furthermore, a higher equilibrium wealth is attained
only by accepting greater inequality.
Observation 6.3 suggests that this need not necessarily be the case. For the growth function
considered in this section, an optimal redistribution rate may exist which maximises the mean
wealth, at which the equilibrium is stable, and where the extent of inequality is less than the
most unequal stable steady states.
Attention is finally turned toward the oscillatory behaviour observed in Figure 6.8. There exist
combinations of parameter sets and initial conditions for which growing oscillations over time
are observed. An argument similar to that used to prove the existence of a critical redistribution
rate in §6.1 suggests that there consequently exist cases which exhibit periodic oscillations over
time. Figure 6.11 depicts such a structure over space and time, obtained using parameter set 3
of Table 6.4. This phenomenon leads to the following observation.
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Figure 6.11: An example of periodically oscillating solution over time resulting from parameter set 3
in Table 6.4. The figures are based on numerical approximations of solutions to the model (6.29)–(6.31)
obtained by applying the method (3.29) with step sizes 4t = 0.01 and 4λ = 1.25× 10−3, and assuming
the initial condition w0(λ) = exp(−10(λ− 1)2).
Observation 6.4 Evidently, linearly increasing per capita wealth growth rates (translating pro-
portional to the level of inequality as well as to the total wealth) is sufficient to produce oscillating
trends in the level of inequality as well as mean wealth in a wealth distribution over time, even
in a society of identical agents without exogenously imposed growth influences.
This suggests that cyclical (periodic) behaviour in socioeconomic systems need not necessarily be
the result of explicit driving forces such as development, as originally conjectured by Kuznets [86].
As mentioned in §2.2, Kuznets’ claims have been disputed, and the reverse of his postulate has
even been claimed [9]. In light of the solution behavioural possibilities demonstrated for the
model (6.29)–(6.31), either a ‘u’-shaped curve or its inverse may be observed in both the extent
of inequality as well as the total wealth, depending on the observation period.
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6.4 Chapter summary
The long-time behaviour of the models of Chapter 4 were considered in this chapter. The
per capita wealth growth-rate functions of §4.4 were incorporated into the models in order
of increasing complexity. For the case of linear per capita wealth growth rates, the reliance
of solution persistence on redistribution was demonstrated and a possible implication for the
Robin Hood paradox was noted. The stability of the constant equilibrium solutions was analysed
analytically and the existence of a nonconstant equilibrium solution was established in the case
of the trickle-down model. The case of mean-dependent linear per capita wealth growth rates
was considered next. It was demonstrated numerically that stable equilibrium solutions to the
trickle-down model exist for a large class of model parameters. The relationship between the
size of the basin of attraction and the redistribution rate was then demonstrated, as was the
relationship between the mean equilibrium wealth and the redistribution rate.
Finally, the mean and inequality-dependent linear per capita wealth growth-rate function was
considered and possible model solution behaviours were demonstrated numerically. The possi-
bility of a finite optimal redistribution rate which maximises expected wealth was uncovered, as
well as the possibility of oscillating solution behaviour over time (even in the absence of explicit
oscillatory model parameter functions).
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The results obtained in Chapters 4–6 are discussed in this chapter and related statements in
the literature (in support or in contradiction of the findings of this thesis) are noted. First, the
validity of the models underlying the arguments made in this thesis is considered and various
limitations are noted in this respect. The result pertaining to solution persistence hinging
on redistribution and its implications for the Robin Hood paradox is then considered. The
fluctuating solution behaviour over time demonstrated in §6.3 and its implications for attempts
at motivating trends in macroeconomics are noted next. The relation between oscillations and
the extent of redistribution is also considered as a motivation for redistributive actions, as
mentioned in §2.4. The possible existence of a unique, finite, optimal extent of redistribution is
finally considered.
7.1 Model validation
The aim of the models adopted in this thesis was to explore theoretical possibilities, rather than
capturing observed phenomena accurately. These models therefore cannot be validated in the
traditional sense by comparing their results to actual observations in the hope of achieving a
small enough discrepancy which may be deemed negligible.
For very simple cases, reasonably expected model solution behaviour could, however, be verified.
For example, in the case of a constant per capita growth rate, wealth growth is independent of
distributional characteristics, and it follows in this case that the total wealth represented by an
aggregation of the model solution over space ought to grow exponentially over time regardless
of the wealth distribution shape. This was verified analytically in §5.2.
The redistribution captured in the models of Chapter 4 is furthermore assumed to be conser-
vative, that is, no wealth is lost or created in the act of redistribution itself. It is therefore to
be expected that the change in the total wealth locally in time should not depend explicitly
85
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on redistribution. The redistribution parameter (the constant d) disappears for both models
in the derivative of the total wealth (see Proposition 5.4), thus satisfying the aforementioned
expectation.
Since redistribution by definition entails transfers that reduce the extent of both types of wealth
inequality considered in this thesis, it is expected that there should always exist a redistribution
rate which ensures that the extent of inequality decreases. This was confirmed in Propositions 5.1
and 5.2 for the two types of redistribution considered. Remarkably, a redistribution rate that
ensures decreasing relative inequality can be found which involves only the extremal values of
the wealth distribution (see Proposition 5.2). Although elegant and appealing in its simplicity,
the significance of this sufficient condition should not be overstated since it depends strongly on
the specific wealth growth-rate functional shapes assumed in the models.
A wealth distribution’s shape is preserved when it is multiplied by a constant and for this
reason relative inequality is invariant under constant per capita growth. It therefore follows
that performing redistribution in respect of an unequal wealth distribution within the context of
constant per capita growth should always result in decreased relative inequality. This expectation
was confirmed in Proposition 5.1.
The expectations that follow naturally for the simplest possible type of wealth growth rate are
therefore fulfilled by the models of this thesis. Furthermore, the model solution behaviours ex-
hibited in the presence of more interesting types of growth, although at times initially surprising,
do not defy logical explanation. The means of validation available in this type of investigation
therefore indicate that the models analysed in this thesis are logically coherent and valid in the
sense of producing solution behaviours deemed plausible under the associated assumptions.
Since the models considered in this thesis employ per capita growth-rate functions which are
special cases of (4.16), no distinction has to be made when discussing the linear per capita
growth models of §6.1 or the mean-dependent per capita growth models of §6.2 in this chapter.
The possibilities in terms of their solution behaviour are included when considering (4.16) and
choosing the appropriate parameters equal to zero.
It is important to note that since the aim in this thesis was to show what is theoretically possible
in certain simple contexts, no predictive or explanatory statements related to reality can be made
in respect of the models of Chapter 4. Solution behavioural possibilities can be uncovered and
possible theoretical justifications for certain policies can be suggested, but no more.
7.2 The Robin Hood paradox
In §2.3, the Robin Hood paradox was reviewed, as were two irreconcilable motivations for its
existence ([82, 83] versus [70, 79]). This emphasizes the importance of viewing prescriptive
theories aimed at explaining economic phenomena in a sceptical light.
It was demonstrated in §6.1 that the persistence of wealth may hinge on the rate of redistribution
(for both types of redistribution considered) and that there therefore exist cases where a lower
bound on the possible extent of redistribution exists if the (global) persistence of wealth is
required. If such a bound exists, there may exist scenarios in which the Robin Hood paradox
necessarily follows. If the growth prospects in a particular economy are dire, such that only a
small portion of the total entities in the economic system are expected to be able to increase
their wealth positions, then the aforementioned bound on redistribution is larger than in the
case where more entities have access to more promising growth prospects. If it is then taken
into account that high levels of economic inequality have been associated with poor growth
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prospects [8, 51, 108, 112, 112], then it may be concluded that less redistribution ought to
transpire in more unequal societies, given that (at least) the collective persistence of wealth is
sought.
No claim is made that the Robin Hood paradox has been resolved or explained. It has simply
been shown that the occurrence of such a contentious phenomenon may follow logically from very
simple and weak assumptions. Its existence therefore does not imply the existence of driving
forces (motivations other than the assumptions made in the previous argument), as is often
assumed in so called explanations for manifestations of the Robin Hood paradox.
7.3 Economic fluctuation
It was demonstrated in §6.3 that fluctuating wealth and inequality levels over time can occur
in the trickle-down model. That this behaviour is possible in a system of homogeneous entities
with no time-dependent growth influences may at first be surprising, but such behaviour is
reminiscent of those exhibited by autonomous mechanical systems, such as pendulums. In view
of this analogy, it is no longer surprising that either vanishing, constant or growing fluctuations
may be produced in the trickle-down model, since such behaviours are easily produced for a
simple pendulum under the appropriate assumptions (weak damping, no damping and negative
damping, respectively).
This very simple model is therefore already capable of producing rich enough solution behaviour
to produce phenomena described by both Kuznets-type curves [86] and their inverses [9]. The
possibility of such fluctuations in this simple model illustrates that fluctuating trends in macroe-
conomic metrics need not be the result of exogenously dictated or explicitly time-dependent
growth processes.
The relationship between redistribution and fluctuating wealth is mentioned in passing by
Hochman and Rodgers [74] in one of the first treatises of optimal redistribution, but was not
considered in the ensuing analytical arguments. They suggested that greater redistribution will
lead to greater income stability and therefore hedge persons against the uncertainty associated
with future income fluctuations. Interdependent personal utility, rather than the aforementioned
intuition, was used to justify redistributive actions theoretically.
In Figure 6.8 (interpreted together with Figure 6.9 (a)) it is apparent that in the presence of
vanishing oscillations, greater redistribution is indeed related to faster vanishing oscillations
within the context of the trickle-down model, which is consistent with the suggestion in [74]. It
was also demonstrated in §6.2 that greater redistribution may be associated with greater stability
(a larger basin of attraction of equilibrium solutions). The trickle-down model is therefore an
example of an analytical model formulation which gives rise to a second theoretical justification
for redistributive actions, entirely independent of the considerations of traditional utility theory.
7.4 Equality and optimal redistribution
It is commonly assumed that utility functions are concave over consumption or income [46], as
mentioned in §2.5. In the simplest possible case, where it is assumed that all individuals share
the same utility function, this leads to the conclusion that total equality of wealth maximises
social welfare. More redistribution would then always be preferable to less redistribution. It was
noted in §2.4 that the introduction of more heterogeneity, such as different levels of individual
productivity, for example, can lead to an unequal distribution of wealth which maximises welfare,
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and which may therefore be called optimal [101]. If the assumptions on the shapes of utility
functions and the combined social welfare function are, however, rejected, then there exist
infinitely many Pareto optimal wealth distributions. The question of how much to redistribute
therefore seems difficult to answer in the absence of assumptions pertaining to utility.
All equilibrium solutions to the trickle-down model are Pareto optimal allocations of wealth, since
any increase (decrease) in the amount of redistribution adversely affects the wealth position of
entities at the top (bottom) of the wealth distribution. If the mean wealth is considered as
well, then a unique maximum in terms of mean wealth can be found, at a finite amount of
redistribution, as demonstrated in §6.3 and particularly in Figure 6.10 (a). Some redistribution
may therefore yield greater total wealth than either no or excessively severe redistribution.
This is an example of a theoretical justification for limited redistributive intervention which is
Pareto optimal in terms of allocation, and uniquely optimal in terms of maximising the total
wealth. A single ‘best’ redistributive strategy is therefore obtained in this case without having
to assume anything about individual utility. This approach is, however, not necessarily superior
or preferable to arguments which rely on utility theory. In fact, a Rawlsian argument may be
adopted to criticise this solution for rendering a subset of the population worse off in pursuit of
increased total wealth, instead of minimising the disadvantages of the least well off. That the
latter aim will arise naturally from the original position relies on the natural risk-averse nature
of most humans [145], and is therefore in a sense reliant on the notion of utility as well. A
perfectly rational (risk-neutral) decision maker who wishes to maximise his expected wealth will
prefer the suggested optimal strategy. Regardless of these considerations, the primary aim was
to demonstrate yet another way in which redistributive actions may be justified theoretically
without appealing to utility theory (or, in this case, considerations related to stability).
The discussions in this and the preceding section refer only to the trickle-down model. The
nonexistence of nonconstant equilibrium solutions to the linear redistribution model is a result
of insufficient adaptability in the redistribution scheme as the wealth distribution changes. This
suggests that proportional contributions should not be fixed to an entity’s position (wealth or
income) and the total wealth only, but should also take the distributional shape into account,
in order to have a stabilising effect on the temporal evolution of a wealth distribution.
7.5 Chapter summary
The implications of the arguments put forward in this thesis were clarified in this chapter
within the context of the relevant literature. First the validity and limitations of the models
underlying the arguments of this thesis were discussed. It was then suggested that the Robin
Hood paradox may, in fact, follow necessarily from fairly simple assumptions. The presence of
oscillatory behaviour in the trickle-down model was also addressed. First, it was noted that
such behaviour can result in this very simple model without exogenous influences. Secondly, the
relationship between redistribution, fluctuations in wealth, and the stability of equilibria was
suggested as an analytical formulation of a possible theoretical justification for redistributive
actions. The existence of a unique finite extent of redistribution which maximises total wealth
was then considered, and another possible justification for redistributive actions was suggested.
A possible implication of the nonexistence of nonconstant equilibrium solutions to the linear
redistribution model was finally noted.
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This chapter comprises three sections. In the first, the contents of this thesis are summarised,
while the second contains an appraisal of and a critique on the contributions made in the thesis.
The final section is dedicated to the documentation of ideas for possible follow-up work related
to the thesis contributions which may be pursued in the future.
8.1 Thesis summary
The discourse on economic inequality was reviewed very briefly in Chapter 2 from the point of
view of social justice, in fulfilment of Objective I(a) of §1.3. The recurring theme of limited
egalitarianism in terms of resource ownership was highlighted in this review. Empirically ob-
served historic trends in economic inequality and certain resulting postulates, such as Kuznets’
famous curve, were then described. The notion of redistribution of wealth was briefly reviewed
by discussing various means of redistribution, the desirability of these various means, and the
relationship between wealth redistribution and economic inequality. The Robin Hood paradox,
which pertains to the relationship between the extent of economic inequality in a society and the
extent of redistribution present therein, as well as differing explanations for the existence of this
paradox, was also noted. The notion of optimal redistribution and theoretical justifications of
redistributive acts were then considered. It was noted that existing theoretical justifications of
redistributive acts rely heavily on utility theory. The measurement of economic inequality was
discussed next and two important classes of indices for measuring inequality were reviewed. Ex-
isting models of wealth distribution were finally reviewed very briefly and the aim of this thesis
was elucidated within the context of the literature review presented in the second chapter.
Certain mathematical prerequisites required to follow the investigation conducted in this thesis
were reviewed in Chapter 3, in fulfilment of Objective I(b). Various mathematical definitions
and theorems used in the arguments of this thesis were reviewed in the first section. A brief
introduction to the field of differential equations was then given, after which a standard clas-
sification of second-order linear PDEs was reviewed. The focus of the discussion next shifted
to reaction-diffusion systems in particular. A method for analysing the stability of equilibrium
89
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solutions to certain initial-boundary value problems involving PDEs was then reviewed. Cer-
tain numerical solution techniques for the approximation of solutions to initial-boundary value
problems involving PDEs were then described briefly, after which emphasis was placed on the
class of finite difference methods, since this was the numerical solution approximation scheme
employed in later chapters.
Two novel mathematical models of wealth distribution were put forward in Chapter 4, in fulfil-
ment of Objective II. First, the underlying model assumptions were noted and motivated, after
which the mathematical model derivations were carried out. The per capita wealth growth-rate
functions to be considered later in this thesis were then introduced. The existence and unique-
ness of solutions to the aforementioned models were established next and it was demonstrated
that these solutions, as well as their first derivatives in space, remain nonnegative for all time.
Two metrics for characterising the extent of wealth equality present in model solutions were then
defined, in fulfilment of Objective III, and their equivalence with traditional measures of wealth
distribution was demonstrated. This was followed by a brief discussion on the interpretation
and use of these metrics. The limitations and intended use of the models introduced were finally
discussed critically and clarified in a formal model apology.
In Chapter 5, sufficient conditions for bounded wealth inequality were established, in fulfilment
of Objective IV. The models derived in Chapter 4 were validated by analysing their solution be-
haviour in the context of a constant per capita wealth growth rate. An expression for the change
in total wealth over time was derived for all per capita growth-rate function types considered
later in the thesis. A necessary and sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality was
established next and an easily verifiable sufficient condition for decreasing relative inequality
was derived from this necessary and sufficient condition, which depends only on the extremal
values of the current wealth distribution. A necessary and sufficient condition for decreasing
absolute inequality was also established and the differences between this condition and that for
relative inequality were noted. Numerical examples illustrating some of the analytic results of
the chapter were finally presented.
The long-time behaviour of solutions to the models of Chapter 4 were considered in the sixth
chapter, in fulfilment of Objective V. The per capita wealth growth-rate functions of §4.4 were
considered in order of increasing complexity. In the case of linear per capita wealth growth rates,
a relationship between solution persistence and redistribution was demonstrated and a possible
implication for the Robin Hood paradox was noted. The stability of the constant equilibrium
model solutions was established analytically and the existence of a nonconstant equilibrium
solution was established in the case of the trickle-down model. The case of mean-dependent
linear per capita wealth growth rates was considered next. It was demonstrated numerically
that stable equilibrium solutions to the trickle-down model exist for a large class of model
parameters. A relationship between the size of the basin of attraction and the redistribution
rate was then demonstrated, as well as a relationship between the mean equilibrium wealth and
the redistribution rate. Finally, mean and inequality-dependent linear per capita wealth growth-
rate functions were considered and possible solution behaviours were demonstrated numerically
for these model incarnations. The possibility of a finite redistribution rate which maximises
expected wealth was uncovered, as well as the possibility of oscillating solution behaviour over
time.
The implications of the findings of the preceding chapters were finally clarified in the seventh
chapter, in fulfilment of Objective VI. First, the validity and limitations of the underlying mod-
els employed to arrive at the arguments put forward in this thesis were discussed. It was then
suggested that the Robin Hood paradox may necessarily follow from fairly simple assumptions.
The presence of oscillatory solution behaviour in the case of the trickle-down model was also
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addressed. First, it was noted that such behaviour can result from this very simple model with-
out exogenous or time-dependent influences. Secondly, a relationship between redistribution,
fluctuations in wealth, and the stability of equilibria was suggested as an analytical formulation
of a possible theoretical justification for redistributive actions. The existence of a unique, finite
extent of redistribution which maximises total wealth was considered next, and this was sug-
gested as another possible justification for redistributive actions. Finally, a possible implication
of the nonexistence of nonconstant equilibrium solutions to the linear redistribution model was
noted.
8.2 Appraisal and critique of thesis contributions
Two models were put forward in this thesis which represent examples of very simple analytic
contexts capable of bringing forth mathematical descriptions of certain basic economic phenom-
ena. Specifically, the notion of increasing (relative) inequality over time was pursued as an
inherent characteristic of wealth growth in free market societies, as was the notion of wealth
redistribution as some transfer of wealth from more wealthy entities to less wealthy entities.
Consideration of increasing per capita wealth growth-rate functions (increasing over wealth), is
one way of capturing increasing relative inequality over time, the very simplest special case of
this being linearly increasing per capita wealth growth-rate functions, which were investigated.
Other than the notion related to increasing inequality over time, the inherent relative value
of wealth (and hence competition to obtain more than the average) as well as the idea that
increases in inequality reduce growth prospects, where captured in the formulation of wealth
growth.
Two examples of redistribution dynamics were investigated. One example mimics diffusion-
like effects, called trickle-down redistribution, and the other represents a conservative linear-tax
transfer scheme.
It was demonstrated that increases in inequality can always be limited in the context of these
models by means of sufficient redistribution. It was also demonstrated that there exist cases
where the persistence of the total wealth hinges on the rate of redistribution, and that from this
occurrence, the Robin Hood paradox may follow. Furthermore, it was illustrated that oscillating
behaviour over time in wealth and inequality can occur even in the very simple contexts of the
models presented in this thesis, in the absence of explicitly time-dependent underlying processes.
It was shown that redistributive actions can be motivated or justified in various ways other
than in terms of the notion of utility, and that these arguments can be formulated analytically.
Whether or not an argument can be formulated analytically is an excellent test of its coherence.
Furthermore, it was illustrated that there can exist a single, finite redistribution rate which
maximises the expected wealth of an entity (above the wealth level associated with an equal
distribution), at a stable equilibrium.
The models in this thesis are far removed from reality. The scope of what can be inferred from
their solutions is therefore limited in definite ways. The functional forms assumed in this thesis
for the growth of wealth and its redistribution only represent examples of choices which capture
certain phenomena. The solution behaviours of these models therefore only represent possibilities
rather than predictions. The majority of results presented are merely demonstrations of why
one should be highly sceptical of, and very careful in, the formulation of narratives that closely
fit empirical observations in macroeconomics and complicated systems of interacting agents in
general.
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The aim in this thesis was not to be overly critical of existing explanations for economic phe-
nomena related to wealth inequality, such as Kuznets’ hypothesis. Instead, the aim was rather
to attempt to convince the reader that these explanations should always be viewed merely as
possibilities, or contributing factors, rather than definitive expositions of the causes and effects
of economic processes.
8.3 Future work
In this final section, four possible avenues for future research following on the work documented
in this thesis are suggested, in fulfilment of Objective VII.
Suggestion 8.1 An analytic treatment of equilibrium solution stability classification.
The primary aim in the analysis of the long-time behaviour of solutions to the models of Chap-
ter 4 was to demonstrate possible solution behaviours, rather than pursue complicated analytic
results related to equilibrium solution stability. For this reason, analytic results related to equi-
librium solution stability were provided only in the very simplest case, namely for constant
equilibrium solutions.
The stability properties of the nonconstant equilibrium solution to the trickle-down model may
be pursued in future. It was demonstrated numerically that in the case of a simple linear per
capita wealth growth-rate function, this solution is unstable. For the two other per capita wealth
growth-rate functions, it was illustrated that there exist parameter sets for which nonconstant
equlibrium solutions to the trickle-down model are indeed stable. In the latter case, in addition
to establishing these stability properties analytically, results related to the size of the basin of
attraction (exactly where bifurcations occur that separate solutions which tend to the same
equilibrium solution from other solutions) may be pursued.
Suggestion 8.2 A model solution classification for the case of (4.16) with c 6= 0 and k 6= 0.
In the case of mean and inequality-dependent per capita wealth growth rates, certain interesting
solution behaviours of the trickle-down model were uncovered during numerical experiments.
An exhaustive classification of all possible behaviours was, however, not performed. Such a clas-
sification may be pursued upon application of scaling techniques aimed at reducing the number
of model parameters to a minimum and performing a systematic search based on numerical
experiments, possibly with the aid of an automated stability classification technique.
Suggestion 8.3 An extension of the models to allow for multiple interacting society cases.
The very simplest case of a single, closed economy was considered in this thesis. By allowing the
wealth function w to be a vector function and incorporating assumptions related to inter-society
competition or collaboration, the models of Chapter 4 may be extended to an n society case. In
this context, the entire system’s stability becomes a question of interest.
Such multiple society models may furthermore be solved in respect of specific network structures,
where only adjacent societies are allowed to interact, in which case the effect of the specific
network structure on the system’s stability becomes a question of interest.
Suggestion 8.4 A generalisation of the basic model assumptions of this thesis.
In order to render the investigation of this thesis tractable, examples of functional forms that
capture certain phenomena (such as increasing wealth inequality over time, or the relative value
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of wealth) were assumed. A more difficult, but perhaps more enlightening, approach might be to
investigate the implications of the basic assumptions only. For example, assuming that the per
capita wealth growth-rate function is any increasing function on wealth. Such an investigation
may be preceded by first investigating more types of per capita wealth growth rate functional
forms which are increasing over wealth in order to gain insight into commonalities between
solutions to models employing increasing per capita growth rates.
The necessary and sufficient conditions for decreasing inequality derived in Chapter 5 applied
to both types of redistribution considered in Chapter 4. Interesting solution behaviours at later
stages in the investigation were, however, limited to only one of the models. This leads to the
question of what can be said in general about any redistribution scheme based on the principle
of transfers, in the context of increasing inequality as an inherent feature of wealth growth. Such
an investigation may be preceded by first investigating other abstractions of redistribution than
the two types considered in this thesis in order to gain insight into the essential characteristics
of redistribution.
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